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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION 
The  importance of  wages to the short and long-run economic performance of  countries 
needs little emphasis in the context of  the present analysis.  It is sufficient simply to point 
to  the fact that wage  increases are  a  crucial element of  price inflation,  of trends  in 
investment profitability  and that  at  the  level  of real  economic  aggregates  that  the 
demand for labour and for other factors of  production are strongly influenced by the 
evolution of  real wages. 
Differences in the _wage formation process at the individual country level therefore carry 
enormous  implications for economies  in  general  but  in  particular for inflation  and 
unemployment developments.  The  behaviour of  nominal wages determines the  degree 
and the duration of  any short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment and in 
this way plays a central role in the transformation of  an economy from an inflationary to 
a less-inflationary regime and the costs associated with that process. 
The wage determination process is consequently at the heart of  an economy's dynamic 
adjustment mechanisms.  Adjusting to  economic shocks is made easier the greater the 
flexibility of  the wage adjustment process with such ''price" flexibility being essential to 
the  restoration  of competitiveness  and to  bringing  output  and employment  back  to 
equilibrium. 
Labour market flexibility,  which includes the concept of  wage flexibility,  is the  overall 
measure used to describe the responsiveness of  an economy's labour market to changes 
in underlying conditions. 
The  degree of  overall labour market flexibility existing in a country is the factor which 
determines the  success or failure of  an economy in absorbing permanent or temporary 
shocks to  labour  demand arising at the  national,  regional or sectoral levels  without 
provoking  large  deteriorations  in  labour  market  conditions.  In  this  context,  it  is 
important to  underline  that if  one accepts the existence of hysteresis in Community 
labour  markets  then  even  temporary  shocks  can provoke permanent or persistent 
effects with regard to unemployment. 
PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF  STUDY 
Given the points raised in the previous paragraphs, it was considered. important to assess 
the  current degree of labour market flexibility in the  Community with a  view  to  both 
quantifying the extent of  the present difficulties and to tentatively suggest possible policy 
initiatives  which  could  be  undertaken  to  strengthen  the  Community's  adjustment 
mechanisms. -4-
There are substantial economic costs involved in having rigid mechanisms for _adjusting 
to cost misalignments and it is these mechanisms which are at the centre of  the present 
study.  The present situation in the EC (including an analysis of  the four largest Member 
States)  is compared with  that pertaining in  the  US  and Japan.  The  wage formation 
process is analysed in the different countries and its importance in terms of  adjustment is 
highlighted as is the related process of  adjustment in terms of  numbers employed 
The main purpose of  the analysis is therefore to assess whether the Community's labour 
markets have been performing well,  in an international comparative sense,  in terms of 
their overall responsiveness to changing circumstances and conditions: 
•  Following an overview of  labour market flexibility in_Section 1, Section 2 looks 
at the wage determination process in detail,  looking firstly at the theoretical and 
empirical aspects of  the Phillips curve relationship before going on to examine 
the  essential characteristics of  the wage determination process in the  different 
countries and to  encapsulate  these  shared characteristics  in  wage  equations 
with a common specification. 
•  Sections 3  and 4 then go on  to  use  the price and unemployment coefficients 
from the respective wage equations to provide quantitative assessments of the 
performances of  the  individual labour markets in terms of  wage flexibility and 
NAIRU developments.  The NAIRU calculations are supplemented by additional 
indicators of  structural unemployment. 
•  The final section attempts to draw  the main policy implications to  be retained 
from the analysis. 
MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Using  an expectations-augmented Phillips  Curve  approach  it is possible  to  provide 
some  indication  of the  changes  in  the  underlying health  of the  Community's  labour 
markets (EC 15,  W. Germany,  France,  Italy and the  UK)  relative to  those in the  US and 
Japan.  In carrying out such an international comparison of  the relative performances of 
individual labour markets two essential aspects of  labour market operations need to  be 
assessed: 
Q_j  _  _.  How  do  the  labour  market  adjustment  mechanisms  of wage  flexibility  and 
employment adaptability compare internationally.  These  mechanisms determine 
the speed of  adjustment of  the labour market to temporary and  permanent shocks. 
If  a country's labour market exhibits considerable sluggishness in adjustment to a 
temporary  or permanent  change  in  economic  conditions  then  this  will  have 
important  implications  in  terms  of the  cost  and duration  of the  adjustment 
process.  Efficient adjustment mechanisms are  crucial to  a  smooth  market 
clearing process with the greater the degree of  clogging of  these mechanisms, the 
greater the degree of  unemployment persistence. 
Q.l...  Are there significant differences in rates of  equilibrium unemployment between 
countries.  A  relatively  high  rate  of equilibrium  or  structural  unemployment 
would be  suggestive  of a greater  degree  of rigidity  or malfunctioning in  the 
respective labour market. -5-
QUESTION 1.  HOW DO THE LABOUR MARKET ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS 
OF  WAGE  FLEXIBILITY  AND  EMPLOYMENT  ADAPTABILITY  COMPARE 
INTERNATIONALLY? 
WAGE FLEXIBILITY:  The  main conclusions regarding flexibility to  be  drawn from 
the analysis presented in the paper are as follows: 
•  The  short-run "overview" indicator for real wage responsiveness shows a high 
degree of  short-run real wage flexibility in both the US and Japan due essentially 
to a high responsiveness of  wages to unemployment in the  case of  Japan and a 
slow response of  wage growth to inflation in the case of  the  US.  A substantially 
more  rigid picture appears for the  European countries as a whole  because of 
relatively rapid indexation and a low cyclical responsiveness of  wages. 
•  In  the  short-run,  therefore,  a  non-accommodation of a one percentage point 
price  rise  (i.e.  the  rise  in  the  price  level  is  not  validated)  would  require 
unemployment to increase by only o: 1 percentage points above the natural rate to 
prevent an acceleration of  wages in the  US and Japan but by 1 percentage point 
in the Community. 
•  Since the long-run inflation elasticities are in general close to unity,  the long-run 
"overview" measure for real wage rigidity only differs from country to  country 
on the basis of  the differences in the estimated unemployment elasticities.  Using 
this measure of  rigidity, unemployment would have to increase by 0.1,  1.3 and 1.8 
percentage points above  the  natural rate  in Japan,  the  US  and the  European 
Community respectively to  offset the  inflationary consequences of  a real shock 
which temporarily increased inflation by one percent. 
Given the above evidence, it is safe to conclude, on the basis of  the short-run indicator of 
real wage rigidity,  that real wages in the  US and Japan are more flexible  than in the 
Community and that using the  long-run indicator that differences continue to  exist but 
are less pronounced between the  US and the  Community and that Japan is the  country 
which stands out as having the most flexible wages even in the long-run.  Furthermore, if 
one groups the  countries according to  their short-run and long-run real wage  rigidity 
measures and compares them  with  the  rise  in unemployment over the period 1973  to 
1994,  one witnesses a distinct positive correlation between the rigidity measures and the 
relative deterioration in the labour market situation of  the respective countries. 
EMPLOYMENT ADAPTABILITY:  In  addition  to  wage  cost  flexibility,  another 
indicator of  the underlying health of  an economy's adjustment processes is the concept of 
employment adaptability i.e.  the speed with which employment adjusts to fluctuations in 
output. 
Employment  adaptability  can  be  measured  by  calculating  the  elasticity  of labour 
productivity advances with respect to  output growth
1
•  The  coefficient estimates for the 
US,  Japan,  the EC and the four largest EC countries indicate clearly that the US has the 
It is important to stress that this is a  very rough measure of employment adaptability since it only refers  to 
units of labour employed and makes no allowance for adjustment in terms of the numbers of hours worked. 
This  is particularly important in,  for example,  the case of Japan  where a  downturn  in  labour  demand has 
traditionally been reflected more in the number of  hours worked than in the shedding of  labour. -6-
most ''flexible" employees with Japan at the other extreme (perhaps reflecting flexibility 
in  hours worked)  and the  Community as a  whole,  as well as the  individual Member 
States, in an intermediate position. 
WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND EMPLOYMENT ADAPTABILITY: It is interesting to 
combine the wage flexibility and employment adaptability indicators since there would 
appear  to  be  a  trade-off between  the  two  concepts  with  countries  with  high  wage 
flexibility exhibiting rigidity in terms of  employment adjustment: 
•  It would appear that economies,  such as Japan,  which  are  characterised by 
highly flexible real wages in the face of  disturbances can better accommodate 
some degree of  labour hoarding. 
•  In  the  case  of the  US,  even  though  real wage flexibility  is not substantially 
different to that in the Community,  this is counterbalanced by a high degree of 
employment flexibility which reflects a large  number of  factors  including the 
paucity of  hiring/firing legislation. 
•  The  "worst of  both worlds",  of course,  is where a country's labour market is 
characterised by both inflexible employment and rigid real wages.  This  "worse 
of both  worlds"  scenario  would appear  to  accurately  reflect  the  situation 
pertaining in the Community. 
OVERALL  CONCLUSION  REGARDING  ADJUSTMENT  MECHANISMS:  The 
evidence presented above shows clearly that the Community's labour market adjustment 
mechanisms of  wage flexibility and employment adaptability compare poorly with those 
pertaining internationally.  Poorly functioning adjustment mechanisms may go some way 
towards explaining the  Community's relatively high rate of unemployment and the fact 
that the Community has only managed an employment growth rate of 12 per cent since 
1960 compared with increases of  45 percent  for Japan and 87 percent in the US. 
QUESTION  2.  ARE  THERE  SIGNIFICANT  DIFFERENCES  IN  RATES  OF 
EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT BETWEEN COUNTRIES ?  This is the second 
essential question to be addressed with regard to making an informed comparison of  the 
relative  performance  of individual  labour  markets.  The  labour  market  adjustment 
mechanisms discussed in relation to Question 1 above refer essentially to the speed with 
which disequilibrium unemployment moves to  its equilibrium rate.  Question  2,  on the 
other hand,  looks at the  equilibrium rate itself and in particular at whether equilibrium 
rates have changed over time in the countries examined. 
The  concept of  the NAIRU was introduced to  define that level of  unemployment which 
persisted even  when  the  labour  market is  in  equilibrium  i.e.  the  equilibrium  rate  of 
unemployment.  The  essential  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  NAIRU  estimates 
presented in the paper is that the NAIRU has risen in all geographical areas,  with the 
notable  exception  of the  US,  over  the  last  number  of decades  i.e.  the  level  of 
unemployment consistent with stable inflation is now much higher than before the shocks 
of the  1970s.  This  general,  almost global,  phenomenon is usually  explained by  the 
slowdown in the trend of  productivity growth,  by the large external oil price shocks and 
by a deterioration in labour market flexibility.  But given that all regions were equally 
affected by the first two of  the latter three factors,  it is trends in relation to labour market 
flexibility  which  must  be  examined in  order  to  explain  the  fact  that  the  European 
Community has been particularly affected with an increase of  close to four percentage -7-
points in the  NAIRU over the period compared with a  1 percentage point increase  in 
Japan and virtually no change in the case of  the US. 
The trends established with regard to the NAIRU calculations are broadly confirmed by: 
A.  Trend unemployment developments as calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter approach. 
B.  Long-Term Unemployment, Outflow Rates and Beveridge Curve Analysis. 
C  Okun Curve Analysis. 
In  overall  terms,  the  various proxy  measures  of structural  unemployment  (NAIRU, 
Beveridge and Okun Curves) show clearly that there has been a strong upward trend in 
structural unemployment for the Community since the early 1970s.  In contrast there has 
been  no  trend  increase  in  US  unemployment  over  the  same  period  despite  both 
experiencing  substantial  economic  shocks  (as  in  the  case  of the  Community)  and 
witnessing increases in both its labour force and employment of  close to 50 percent over 
the period as a whole  (compared with  18 %  and 5 % respectively  in  the  case  of the 
Community).  In addition,  other indicators of  labour market rigidity such as long-term 
unemployment  and outflow  rates  paint a  similarly  negative  overall picture for  the 
Community. 
IS THE TREND RISE IN COMMUNITY UNEMPLOYMENT A HYSTERESIS OR 
SLOW  ADJUSTMENT  PROBLEM? 
A  large  number of commentators  have found it hard to  accept  that  the  substantial 
deterioration  in  structural  unemployment  in  the  Community  which  has  occurred,  as 
measured by the NAIRU etc.,  could be due totally to changes in the determinants of  the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment.  Their  suspicions have  led to  an alternative  thesis 
being put forward which  suggests  that  the  past level  of actual  unemployment  may 
strongly influence the current rate of  equilibrium unemployment - the idea of  hysteresis. 
Hysteresis,  among other things,  is related to  the fact that the  impact on wages of an 
increase in unemployment is smaller when the rate of  unemployment is already at a high 
level,  than in conditions of  low unemployment.  Therefore,  once unemployment has risen, 
persistence mechanisms will ensure  that it cannot immediately be  brought back to  the 
NAIRU without a permanent rise  in inflation.  To prevent the  latter it is necessary to 
gradually reduce unemployment, thus introducing the idea of  "speed limits" on growth. 
"Speed limits"  on growth,  or  hysteresis,  is shown  up  in  the  wage  equations  in  the 
coefficient  on  the  change  in  unemployment  variable.  These  speed  limits  on 
unemployment reduction could well reflect the relatively weak impact on wage formation 
processes of  the long-term unemployed  It is highly significant in this regard that for the 
Community as a whole  that the  size of  the  coefficient on  the  change  in  unemployment 
variable is close to that of  the coefficient for the level of  unemployment.  This is also the 
situation pertaining in Italy where the change in unemployment variable is substantially 
more  important  than  the  level of unemployment as  an  explanatory  variable  in  wage 
developments.  These  developments would suggest  that  the  change in unemployment 
variable has an independent and significant influence on wage developments and that 
therefore "speed limits" on growth could be a problem in some Community countries. -8-
POLICY  IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is suggested in the above discussion that the trend rise in EC unemployment witnessed 
over the last two decades emanates from no one single factor.  It is partially the result of 
a  number  of adverse  shocks  e.g.  the  two  oil price  crises  in  the  seventies,  counter 
inflationary demand policies in  the  1980s  etc.  which  had a particularly pronounced 
effect on EC countries because real wage rigidity there was relatively high.  However, 
these adverse shocks alone were not large enough to explain the observed trend increase 
in actual unemployment during the 1980s.  Consequently, other factors such as hysteresis 
effects, would appear to have been at play. 
While  it  can  be  argued whether  the  above  factors  fully  explain  the  trend  rise  in 
Community unemployment over the last twenty years,  it appears reasonable to conclude 
that the  explanation for the  bulk of the  increase  in  trend unemployment lies  in some 
combination of  equilibrium (i.e.  NAIRU) and slow adjustment effects. 
If the  latter  analytical conclusion  is  accepted it has  important  implications for  the 
balance of  macro I micro policies in any solution to the unemployment problem: 
i)  Firstly.  it is clear that macroeconomic policy has an important role  to play in 
preventing unemployment from  rising  in  the  first place  thereby  reducing  the 
impact of  hysteresis effects which have the effect of  making it more difficult to get 
unemployment down once it has been allowed to rise. 
ii)  Secondly. such an analytical distinction also supports the widely held contention 
that supply-side measures,  both in terms of  enhancing labour market flexibility 
and active labour market policies, must be the most important part of  any policy 
programme aimed at both reducing the already high level of  unemployment and 
of avoiding any further  trend increases  in  the  total.  Flexibility  enhancing 
measures are needed to  reduce equilibrium unemployment and to speed up the 
adjustment process,  whereas active labour market policies,  in combination with 
human  capital  policies,  are  in  particular  needed  to  act  on  persistent 
unemployment. 
If,  for  example,  the  trend  rise  is  due  to  hysteresis  effects  (i.e.  an  equilibrium 
phenomenon) then macroeconomic policies have little or no role to play in remedying the 
situation and solutions must therefore be found in structural reforms. 
Even  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  trend rise  in  unemployment  is  due  in part to  slow 
adjustment  or  "stickiness"  of unemployment following  negative  disturbances  to  the 
economy,  then  while  macroeconomic  policy  interventions  have  a  role  to  play  in 
attenuating these  disturbances,  structural policies have  the  key role  in acting on those 
factors which speed up the duration of  the adjustment process between the occurrence of 
a shock and the  return of the  system to  a state of  equilibrium  (e.g.  acting on the  slow 
adjustment of  the reservation wage,  minimum wage legislation, hiring/firing rules etc.). 
Structural reforms must  therefore  aim  to  accelerate  the real wage  and employment 
atljustment process following  a  disturbance  in  order  to  avoid  the  phenomenon  of 
"temporary"  shocks  having permanent  or persistent  effects  on  unemployment.  It is 
contended that growing "insider" power has reduced the fear of unemployment among 
the  employed and the  social protection I tax system has operated in a way which has 
diminished the competition for jobs from the unemployed outsiders.  Consequently, the -9-
whole dynamics of  the adjustment process to temporary or permanent shocks has been 
significantly changed 
Higher unemployment,  both current and  past, should have the effect of  dampening wage 
demands with this restraining effect being an important channel by which labour markets 
return to equilibrium.  However,  substantial intervention in the workings of  the  labour 
market is having the  effect of clogging up  these  normal adjustment channels thereby 
preventing the necessary degree of  real wage adjustment from occurring i.e.  wages are 
becoming less responsive to changes in unemployment. 
Action to  address this problem of  unemployment persistence will require substantive 
measures to be taken in a large number of  areas, including the operation of  centralised 
wage bargaining, social protection, hiring I firing legislation etc.  with the unambiguous 
objective of  reducing the entrenched nature of  insider power. 
To sum up therefore, policies aimed at enhancing labour market flexibility will improve 
the functioning of the  labour market in a medium-term perspective with active labour 
market policies I human capital policies being needed to work on reducing the impact of 
important persistence mechanisms in the labour market which in particular have resulted 
in an ever-rising proportion of  long-term unemployed in the overall jobless totals. -10-
SECTION 1:  OVERVIEW OF LABOUR MARKET FLEXffiiLITY 
Labour market flexibility is the overall term used to describe the degree of  responsiveness 
of labour markets to changing  supply  and  demand  conditions.  Flexible labour markets 
allow  adjustments  to  economic  shocks  to  take  place  which  result  at  the  end  of the 
adjustment  process  in  little  or  no  employment  loss.  As  a  result  differences  in 
unemployment performances between countries can often be explained in terms of  relative 
differences  in the underlying  flexibility  of the  respective  labour  markets with rigidities 
being reflected in relatively high and often increasing levels of  structural unemployment. 
It is  important  to  stress  that  a  certain  degree  of labour  market  rigidity  could,  under 
particular conditions, be regarded as an indispensable part of  labour market efficiency.  In 
circumstances such as for example in the context of  long-term work relationships, income 
smoothing/wage rigidity may be a desirable objective for both employers and employees 
alike.  For employers, income smoothing would be acceptable if fluctuations in  demand 
conditions were within an acceptable  range  and were perceived to be temporary.  For 
employees, stable wage incomes hold obvious benefits compared to volatile income flows 
both in  terms  of security  and  consumption planning.  Consequently,  given  the  mutual 
benefits emanating from entering into such long-term work arrangements, some degree of 
wage rigidity may be consistent with an optimal degree of  labour market efficiency. 
However, the compatibility of  an element of  wage rigidity and labour market efficiency 
can only be  assured in the absence of serious economic  disturbances.  Unexpected 
demand  or  supply  shocks  often  necessitate  a  fundamental  review  of employer  and 
employee expectations embedded into long-term working arrangements. 
2 
The shocks of  the 1970s and 1980s required the introduction of fundamental changes in 
economic  relationships  as  a result  of the  trend  decline  in productivity growth and  the 
terms of trade losses experienced.  The smoothness of this structural change process is 
essentially  determined  by  the  degree  of flexibility  of the  labour  market  adjustment 
mechanisms.  The  observed  high  degree  of inflexibility  was established  by  the  relative 
strengths  of the  respective  parties  to  the  previously  established  work  contracts  with 
employers wishing to dismantle,  and employees wishing to retain,  the old framework of 
wage determination and related non-wage conditions of  employment. 
Labour market rigidities  in  the  face  of such  shocks  can  consequently be regarded  as 
being synonymous with the degree of resistance to fundamental  shifts in previous long-
term contractual relationships.  This  resistance,  or short-run stickiness of wages in the 
face  of disturbances, slows down the necessary process of adjustment thereby increasing 
the economic costs of  this latter process. 
2  This conclusion may also apply to more temporary shocks if  wage persistence, which in this case is due to the 
length  of  the  wage  contract,  is  only  one  of  many  wage  persistence  mechanisms  (e.g.  centralised  wage 
bargaining, generous social protection etc.) operating in  a  particular labour market.  Wage persistence of any 
kind  as well as employment persistence (for example due to relatively strict employment protection legislation) 
imply unemployment persistence i.e. slow adjustment to labour market disequilibria. - 11-
FIGURE 1: LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY- A DIAGRAMMATIC OVERVIEW -12-
WAGE FLEXffiiLITY I EMPLOYMENT ADAPTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT 
OF LABOUR MARKET FLEXffiiLITY:  Given the breadth of the subject matter to 
be examined it is important to state clearly at the outset the scope of the present study. 
Figure 1 attempts to give a broad overview of all the essential aspects of labour market 
flexibility broken down under two main headings: 
A)  LABOUR COST FLEXIBILITY 
B)  QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ADAPTABILITY 
As  figure  1 makes clear,  labour cost flexibility  refers to both aggregate real labour cost 
flexibility  at the macroeconomic level  and  the  adaptability  of wage  differentials  at the 
microeconomic level (see Klau and Mittelstadt-1986).  Adjusting to economic shocks is 
made  easier  if absolute  and  relative  real  labour  costs  adjust  relatively  flexibly.  Such 
cost/price flexibility  (i.e.  real  wage  flexibility),  as  mentioned  previously,  is  essential  in 
restoring both competitiveness and equilibrium levels of  output and employment. 
With regard to quantitative and qualitative (i.e. non-wage) adaptability, the following 
issues are the obvious candidates for discussion: 
•  Employment adaptability; 
•  Geographical and occupational labour mobility; and 
•  Flexibility in the use of  labour reflected in working time and work schedules. 
Clearly  all  the  aspects  of labour  market flexibility  discussed  above  are  of importance. 
However, for the purposes of this study it has been decided to limit the discussion to the 
macroeconomic  aspects  of flexibility  i.e.  real  labour  cost  flexibility  and  employment 
adaptability at the economy-wide level with the main emphasis on the former.  It was felt 
that  an  assessment  at  the  macro-economic  level  was the  correct starting  point for  an 
analysis  of labour market flexibility  since  it gave  a rapid  and  reliable  overview of the 
essential problems presently being faced  by  the Community and  since it was also  more 
amenable to quantitative assessment using internationally comparable indicators. 
1.1.  DISTINCTION  BETWEEN  LABOUR  COST  FLEXffiiLITY  AND 
INSTITUTIONALISED WAGE MODERATION 
It is  important to distinguish at the outset between the concept of labour cost flexibility 
and wage moderation. 
•  The  former  in  this  study  refers  to the  speed  and  extent  to which real  wages 
automatically  adjust  to  changes  in  productivity  or  the  terms  of trade  (a 
theoretical  possibility)  thereby  avoiding  the  development  of large  positive  or 
negative real wage gaps and unjustified imbalances in factor income distribution. 
•  The concept of real wage moderation, on the other hand, can be seen as a non-
automatic mechanism for  ensuring  a moderate wage evolution through direct 
interference in the wage determination process. 
Consequently, real wage moderation can be seen as a substitute for labour cost flexibility 
and the extent to which countries make recourse to wage moderation can be regarded, to 
a large extent, as  an attempt to offset the negative effects arising from behavioural,  and 
government induced, distortions in their respective wage determination processes. -13-
Real and nominal labour cost flexibility are macroeconomic concepts.  Perfect real labour 
cost flexibility  would  result  in  complete  and  immediate  adjustments  of real  wages  to 
changes in productivity or the terms of trade.  This degree of flexibility is  not feasible in 
the real world and as mentioned earlier may not, in certain circumstances, be compatible 
with labour market efficiency. 
However, it is  generally agreed that a high degree of aggregate real wage flexibility  is 
desirable with speedy adjustments of  real wages to losses in the terms of  trade or to trend 
declines in total factor productivity necessary to avoid the development of  positive "real 
wage gaps".  A  sluggish  downward  adjustment  in  real  wages  leads  to  an  unjustified 
imbalance in factor income distribution.  This imbalance tends to be painfully reduced over 
time by two main mechanisms: 
A.  COST-INDUCED LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES:  Labour productivity gains 
result both from the substitution of capital for labour as  a result of the reduced 
relative attractiveness of  the latter factor of  production (i.e. resulting in an increase 
in  the  capital  intensity  of production)  and  from  rationalisation  of unprofitable 
operations. 
B.  WAGE  MODERATION:  Cost-induced  labour  productivity  gains  anstng  under 
mechanism  (A)  lead  to  higher  unemployment  which  in  turn  puts  downward 
pressure  on  real  wage  increases  (i.e.  the  weakening  demand  for  labour  puts 
downward pressure on real wages). 
The  operation of the  two  adjustment  mechanisms  mentioned  above  show  dearly that 
reductions  in  real  wage  gaps  should  not be  blindly  attributed  to  enhanced  real  wage 
flexibility and to a possible shift in wage behaviour. 
3  It is more likely that the elimination 
of such  gaps  is  due  more  to  real  wage  moderation  associated  with  the  increases  in 
unemployment  which  typically  accompany  such  cost-induced  increases  in  labour 
productivity rather than to any  genuine  improvement in  labour  cost  flexibility  i.e.  any 
increase in the responsiveness of  real wages to changes in demand or supply conditions. 
Reducing real wage gaps in the way described above is  consequently a reflection of the 
underlying  degree  of rigidity  in  national  or Community  labour  markets  and  is  often 
synonymous  with  rising  structural  unemployment,  with  the  initial  increase  in  classical 
"disequilibrium" unemployment leading eventually to an increase in the natural rate. 
Real  wage moderation becomes  therefore  an  essential  mechanism for  dealing  with  the 
initial real wage rigidity and should not be seen as indicative of a shift in the underlying 
responsiveness of the system of wage  determination.  A truly  flexible  system  of wage 
formation, resulting "naturally" in a moderate wage evolution, is simply the end result of 
actions  aimed  at improving labour market flexibility  whereas wage moderation brought 
about by an institutional wage bargaining process can in some ways be seen as a substitute 
for fundamental labour market reforms. 
Elimination, or reduction, of real wage gaps has essentially been the result of delayed wage adjustments to the 
earlier  supply  shocks  as  well  as  cost induced  productivity  adjustments  associated  with  redundancies  and 
accelerated scrapping of capital.  This process of removal of real  wage gaps represented an ex-post validation 
of the existence of above-equilibrium real wage levels. - 14-
SECTION 2:  WAGE  FORMATION  PROCESS:  EXPECTATIONS 
AUGMENTED PHILLIPS CURVE 
The  expectation-augmented  Phillips  curve  approach  is  used  in  this  and  the  following 
sections  to  provide  some  indication  of the  changes  in  the  underlying  health  of the 
Community's labour markets relative to those in the US  and Japan.  Have these markets 
been performing well in terms of their overall responsiveness to changing circumstances 
and conditions?  Has there been fundamental shifts in the wage determination processes in 
individual  countries  and  how  does  their  performance  compare  with  developments 
elsewhere in the world? 
The  Phillips  curve  approach  is  a  useful  analytical  tool  for  assessing  the  extent  and 
direction of structural change in the labour market as it traces the simultaneous evolution 
of  the ultimate target variables of inflation and unemployment in the countries concerned. 
It therefore provides essential information as  to the performance of individual countries 
both in terms of these two variables and in terms of their performance relative to other 
similar countries (Fuhrer, 1995). 
Finally, the labour market forms a vital part of the aggregate supply side of  the economy 
and therefore the Phillips curve analysis can provide an interesting picture of  the degree of 
responsiveness  inherent in  the underlying  structure of the  economies  concerned.  This 
latter characteristic  of responsiveness  or flexibility  will  be  a  crucial  determinant  of an 
economy's ability to successfully adapt to a rapidly changing global environment. 
2.1  INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT- A PHILLIPS CURVE ANALYSIS 
THEORETICAL  OVERVIEW:  Annex 1 briefly  describes  the  theoretical  framework 
surrounding the inflation-unemployment relationship.  A knowledge of this framework is 
essential in order to assess the key underlying question of whether governments are in a 
position to  make  inroads  into  the unemployment  totals  by  engineering  higher  rates  of 
unanticipated inflation.  The essential points to be retained from Annex 1 are as follows: 
•  Up  until the  late  1960s  there  appeared  to  be  a  stable  trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment but just as  policy-makers began their attempts to 
exploit this apparent trade-off the relationship began to break down. 
•  The  empirical  breakdown  of the  Phillips  curve  relationship  had  been 
impressively predicted by Friedman and Phelps.  They argued that what was 
important  to  both workers  and  employers  was  what  happened  to  real  not 
money wages (i.e.  economic agents lack money illusion)  and that in the long-
run the Phillips curve was in fact  vertical with no  trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment.  However, they did accept that a short-run trade-off could 
exist when an economy was moving from one equilibrium to another such as 
for example in the case of  an unexpected rise in inflation. 
•  Friedman and Phelps introduced two key concepts into the traditional Phillips 
curve  analysis  i.e.  inflation  expectations  and  the  natural  rate  of 
unemployment.  These  insights  were  quickly  incorporated  into  mainstream 
thinking in the form of  the expectations-augmented Phillips curve.  In this view 
of the world,  wage developments depended both on inflationary  expectations 
and on the deviation of unemployment from the natural rate of unemployment - 15-
with the price of any  expansionary policy to reduce unemployment being  an 
ever-rising or accelerating rate of  inflation. 
•  Therefore,  if one  accepts  this  thesis  then the  only  way  for  governments  to 
reduce  unemployment  is  through  a  long-term  commitment,  at  the 
microeconomic  level,  to  improving  the  workings  of the  labour  market  and 
consequently reducing the "natural" rate. 
PHILLIPS CURVE ANALYSIS:  INDICATOR OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND  OF 
THE UNDERLYING HEALTH OF THE SUPPLY SIDE OF AN ECONOMY. 
The  Phillips  curve  is  a  diagrammatic  representation  of the  inflation-unemployment 
relationship,  depicting the simultaneous evolution of these two key variables  over time, 
with demand side shocks expected to result in short-term movements along a negatively 
sloped curve (i.e. the short-run Phillips curve) and with structural, supply side, shifts being 
reflected  in  movements  of the  curve  itself  Consequently,  a Phillips  curve  analysis  is 
useful  not  only  for  assessing  the  present  degree  of real  wage  flexibility/rigidity  in  an 
economy but also for assessing structural shifts over time. 
The elasticity of the short-run Phillips  curve can therefore be  seen  as  representing the 
important structural characteristics or flexibility of  the labour market at a particular 
point in time.  Over the longer-run, leftward or rightward movements of  the curve can be 
seen as representing a change in the underlying structure of the economy as  a result, for 
example,  of experiencing  substantial  shocks or as  a result  of economic  agents  altering 
their behaviour when faced with substantial shifts in the existing macroeconomic policy 
environment,  such as  for  example  in  monetary  policy  through the  adoption  of a  hard 
currency stance. 
•  The latter example would be regarded as a policy-induced structural or regime 
change which should reflect itself eventually,  following  a period of transitional 
credibility-building which would be needed to alter agents' expectations, in a new 
short-term trade-off schedule associated with lower inflation. 
•  The speed with which the latter structural change takes place depends not only 
on the credibility of the policy pursued but also  to an extent on the underlying 
flexibility  of the economy concerned.  In addition to slowing down the pace of 
structural  change,  the  positive  gains  in  terms  of  reduced  inflationary 
expectations, associated with such a policy regime change,  could be offset by  a 
deterioration  in  the  underlying  responsiveness  of the  labour  market  as 
reflected in rising NAIRU  s and persistence mechanisms. 
This  issue  of the  effect  of a  "regime"  change,  represented  by  for  example joining the 
ERM,  is  of vital  importance in  terms  of interpreting  Phillips  curve  movements  in  the 
Community in the 1980s.  Did the ERM have an effect on the adjustment process in terms 
of  making the process quicker and less costly?  There is unfortunately very little empirical 
evidence to support this contention (see Egebo and Englander,  1992).  It was expected 
that joining the ERM would enhance a country's disinflationary credibility and as a result 
inflationary expectations would fall.  While the latter has occurred it would appear that the 
beneficial effects of enhanced credibility on inflationary expectations have been offset by 
growing signs of increases in  labour market rigidities  as  reflected in increasing rates of 
trend unemployment. -16-
EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  SHORT-RUN  PHILLIPS  CURVE 
RELATIONSHIP 
Phillips curves diagramatically present the wage adjustment process to a price shock or, in 
the case of non-accommodation, the unemployment adjustment process to a price shock. 
Graphs  1 and 2 present the empirical evidence for the existence of a short-run Phillips 
curve relationship. 
In relation to the Phillips curve for the  EC, Japan and the US the most striking feature is 
the flatness of  the curve for the Community compared with the almost vertical slope of  the 
Japanese  Phillips  curve  contrasting  clearly  the  highly  responsive  wage  determination 
process in Japan compared with the sluggishness of the wage adjustment mechanisms in 
the Community. 
Changes in the inflation-unemployment relationship  in the  Community can be assessed 
further by dividing the overall Phillips curve movements over the last two decades into 
four sub-periods. 
A.  Between  the  oil  shocks:  (1974-1978):  Outward  shift  of the  Phillips  curve 
reflecting the simultaneous rise in inflation and unemployment which occurred. 
In addition,  there was a movement downwards  along  the  curve reflecting  the 
influence of demand factors.  It is  not surprising that the adverse  supply  side 
shocks of  the 1970s shifted the curve outwards since the underlying theory of  the 
Phillips curve is based on demand side shocks. 
B.  Period (rom second oil shock to earlv 1980s: A movement to the right (reflects 
a  structural  deterioration  in  the  economy),  reflecting  high  inflationary 
expectations and higher levels of structural unemployment with the latter being 
linked, perhaps, to the productivity slowdown. 
C.  Earlv 1980s-Hardening of ERM:  reappearance of the Phillips  curve with the 
trade-off reflecting  a  substantial disinflation at the cost of a  substantial rise in 
unemployment.  The  Phillips  curve  started  to  move  inwards  because  of the 
success of  restrictive demand policies in fighting inflationary expectations. 
D.  Hardening o(ERM-Present: 
1>  In some Community countries,  such as  Italy,  there has been a general 
continued  movement  downwards  to  the  right  as  in  period  C  above, 
reflecting  the on-going lowering  of inflationary  expectations  allied  to 
sharp  increases  in  unemployment.  This  disinflation  process  did  not 
therefore represent a fundamental change in wage behaviour. 
1>  In other countries there was a leftward movement reflecting perhaps a 
fundamental change in the relationship between wage rate changes and 
changes  in unemployment  due  to  positive  supply-side  shocks.  This 
reflected  itself in a genuine  structural disinflation process - structural 
wage moderation - with the  essential trade-off between inflation  and 
unemployment changing for the better.  However, while some evidence 
existed  for France over the period  1987-90,  it would appear that the 
only  sustained  case of a  structural improvement towards lower wage 
settlements is in the UK, although it may be pre-mature to conclude that 
this trend is permanent. -17-
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THE OUTPUT I  UNEMPLOYMENT  SACRIFICE  RATIO:  Phillips  curves  were 
traditionally  used  to  assess  to  what  extent  governments  could  buy  a  lower  rate  of 
unemployment by accepting a higher rate of inflation.  The "Sacrifice" ratio looks at the 
opposite question i.e. what is the unemployment cost of  reducing inflation.  In essence the 
sacrifice ratio is equal to the inverse of  the slope of  the short-run Phillips curve.  It tells us 
how  much  a  country  is  prepared  to  sacrifice  (in  terms  of  temporarily  higher 
unemployment) to achieve a permanent reduction in inflation of a certain percentage and 
clearly the steeper the curve  the smaller the sacrifice. 
The steepness of the curve is heavily influenced, of course, by expectations which in the 
case of  expected inflation is largely determined by the credibility of  government policy.  If 
economic agents believe governments when they say they are going to cut inflation, then 
unemployment would not have to increase since actual and  expected inflation would be 
the same.  Consequently, the higher a government's disinflationary credibility the lower the 
sacrifice in terms of the temporary rises in unemployment needed in reducing inflation. 
Linking one's currency to a hard currency regime  or substantial evidence of a country's 
commitment  to  fiscal  consolidation.  would  obviously  add  to  its  inflation-fighting 
credentials and consequently to a break in inflationary expectations. 
Given that the NAIRU (equilibrium unemployment) is included in the constant term the 
slope  of the  short-run  Phillips  curve  shows  how  much  of  a  temporary  rise  in 
unemployment above the NAIRU is needed to offset the inflationary consequences of a 
price shock (i.e. what is the price of  non-accommodation). 
If  a price shock of 1 percent occurs then the choice is between allowing wages to increase 
by  1 percent (absence of money illusion)  or increasing unemployment temporarily by  a 
certain  amount  over  the  NAIRU  to  avoid  the  acceleration  in  prices.  According  to 
estimates from  the  wage  equations  in  Section 2.2,  non-accommodation of a  1 percent 
price shock would require an increase of: 
•  1. 8 percentage points above the NAIRU in the EC (due to fast  indexation and 
poor responsiveness of  wages to changes in unemployment); 
•  1.3 percentage points above the NAIRU in the US (due to slow indexation and 
slightly more responsive wages); and 
•  0.1 percentage points above the NAIRU in Japan (due to highly responsive wage 
mechanisms to changes in unemployment). 
These differences in the respective performances of the three geographical areas can,  of 
course,  be  corroborated  by  a visual  examination  of their  respective  short-run  Phillips 
curves.  It should be stressed however that one should concentrate only on the relative 
and not the absolute differences in the respective performances since when Phillips curves 
are  shifting  and  the  relative  importance  of  individual  determinants  changes,  the 
interpretation of  sacrifice ratios becomes difficult. 
CONCLUSIONS OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
It would appear from this empirical analysis that two broad conclusions can be made in 
relation to the unemployment-inflation trade off: -20-
1.  The short-run Phillips curve I sacrifice ratio trade-off exists although it varies 
across countries and is subject to different lag structures.  In addition the trade-off 
appears to be gradually deteriorating in a number of  Community countries. 
2.  There  was  a  substantial outward movement of the  Phillips  curves for  the 
European countries over the 1970s reflecting both rising inflationary expectations 
and the fact that the level of unemployment needed to contain inflation had risen. 
The onset of the  1980s brought about the introduction of a generally more non-
accommodating  policy .  stance which has  been  reflected  in  reduced  inflationary 
expectations.  However, the enhanced credibility effects emanating from this more 
non-accommodating stance may have been counterbalanced by an increase in the 
degree of  labour market rigidity in certain countries. 
2.2  WAGE  FORMATION  PROCESS:  EXPECTATIONS  AUGMENTED 
WAGE EQUATIONS 
Sections 3 and 4 of  the present paper attempt to provide some quantification for the main 
underlying influences at work in terms of  the dynamics of  the Phillips curve changes i.e. an 
attempt to provide internationally comparable estimates for real wage rigidities (i.e.  slope 
of  the short-run curves) and for NAIR.Us (i.e.  movements of the curve).  This sub-section 
starts with the estimation of wage equations which include the Phillips curve framework 
because this is one of  the main mechanisms for calculating rigidities and NAIRU  s. 
While  we  are  essentially  only  examining  the  Phillips  curve  mechanism  in  the  wage 
equation it is essential to properly specify the wage equation in order to obtain the most 
robust  coefficient  estimates for  the price  and  wage variables.  Therefore,  it  would  be 
wrong to simply include an inflation and an activity variable as explanatory variables since 
an  accurate  reflection  of the  wage  determination  process  in  each  of the  countries 
mentioned should be given. 
AUGMENTED PHILLIPS CURVE WAGE EQUATIONS:  As  the  section on the 
Phillips curve makes clear, most mainstream economists accept the existence of a short-
run  and  a  long-run  "expectations-augmented"  Phillips  curve.  The  Phillips  curve  can 
consequently  be  regarded  as  a  representation  of the  dynamic  adjustment  process  of 
nominal wages to changes in those factors  which best characterise the macroeconomic 
wage determination process in the individual countries. 
The speed of the adjustment process is  determined by the underlying flexibility of wage 
and price-setting arrangements with the presence of  real and nominal rigidities leading to a 
potentially  protracted  period  of adjustment  before  equilibrium  is  restored  following  a 
shock. 
Consequently, although a trade-off between inflation and unemployment may exist in the 
short-run (i.e.  the coefficient on the price variable in the relevant wage equation is  less 
than 1) it is generally agreed that when inflationary expectations have adjusted fully to the 
new  situation  that  the  long-run  Phillips  curve  is  vertical  at  the  natural  rate  of -21-
unemployment i.e.  the labour market is in equilibrium.
4  Normally,  however,  the labour 
market is in disequilibrium and nominal wage developments will reflect this situation. 
The general formulation of  the short-run Phillips curve used in  the attached analysis 
relates  the  dependent  variable  (i.e.  the  rate  of change  of nominal  compensation  per 
employees) to changes in inflation (private consumption deflator), various measures of  the 
unemployment rate, a terms of trade effece and actual, as opposed to trend, productivity 
developments.  In other words, the specification is virtually identical to the one used in the 
wage equations in the Quest model and to those used by the OECD's Interlink model.  In 
effect the results presented are simply a re-estimation of these general form equations in 
order to incorporate more recent data.  The only  addition is  the inclusion of a specific 
wage equation for  the Community  as  a whole as  opposed to using  simply  a weighted 
average of  the results from the country equations.  However, while the general form of  the 
equation is  similar,  it is  nevertheless important to justify the specification adopted.  An 
analysis of  the specification issues involved is consequently given in Annex 2. 
WAGE EQUATIONS: The general form ofthe equation is: 
4 
5 
WAGE= C(l) * PCE + C(2) *UNEMP + C(3) *UNEMPC + C(4) *TOT 
+ C(5)*PROD + C(6) 
where: 
WAGE=  Annual% change in Nominal Compensation per Employee (Total 
Economy) 
PCE =  Annual % change in the Private Consumption Deflator 
UNEMP=  Annual Rate ofUnemployment (Unemployment as a% ofthe 
Civilian Labour Force) 
UNEMPC = Change in Annual Unemployment Rate (First Difference) 
TOT= 
PROD= 
Terms of  Trade (Difference between the growth rate of  the PCE 
deflator and the GDP deflator) 
Annual % change in Labour Productivity (defined as GDP at 
constant market prices per person employed) 
The  policy  implications  of this view  are  clear,  governments  which  are  serious  in  their  attempts  to  reduce 
"equilibrium"  unemployment  must  concentrate  on  microeconomic· measures  to  improve  the  flexibility  or 
responsiveness  of  the  labour  market  as  opposed  to  resorting  to,  ultimately  fruitless,  reflationary 
macroeconomic  policies.  Some  economists  would  go as  far as  calling  into  question the  usefulness  of the 
augmented Phillips Curve approach to modelling aggregate  wage and  price behaviour on the grounds that if 
expectations are formed rationally no  trade-off exists between inflation and  unemployment even in the short-
run.  This view  however is  rejected  by  an  extensive  array  of research  on  the  microeconomics  of  sluggish 
adjustment.  The slower the pace of adjustment back to equilibrium following a shock the greater the potential 
for a short-run trade-off to exist between inflation and unemployment. 
Terms of Trade variable (PCE  Deflator-GOP Deflator): This variable is  a  proxy for the internal terms of trade 
within the firm and tries to reflect the latter's bargaining power.  It can be seen as  a counterpart to the Phillips 
curve  effect in  the  equation.  It  approximates  closely  to  the  concept  of  net  operating  surplus  and  is  an 
indicator of the degree of market power a  firm possesses i.e. the degree to which a firm can influence the 
price of its output and consequently its degree of bargaining power in terms of wage negotiations. -22-
The  unemployment  rate,  in  the  above  equation,  is  the main  disequilibrium  component 
since it serves as a proxy for excess demand in the labour market.  Equilibrium phenomena 
such  as  the  natural  rate  of unemployment  and  trend  productivity  are  not  modelled 
explicitly but form part of  the constant which is the overall equilibrium component of  the 
equation. 
Given the fact that wages and prices are closely interconnected, with each influencing the 
determination of the  other,  it would  be  imprudent to  assume  that  the  right  hand  side 
inflation variable in the above wage equation is exogenous.  In these circumstances, given 
that the OLS estimation technique would produce biased estimates, it is more appropriate 
to use an estimation method,  such as  Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS),  which would 
avoid any potential problems associated with simultaneous equation bias. 
The  TSLS  estimates  of the  basic  equations  for  the  US,  Japan  and  the  Community, 
including W. Germany,  France,  Italy and  the UK are given in  Table  1 with the detailed 
regression results for each country contained in Annex 3.  For purposes of comparison, 
the OLS  estimates were also  calculated.  The essential  conclusion to be  drawn from  a 
comparison  of the  OLS  and  TSLS  estimates  is  the  remarkable  degree  of similarity 
between  both  sets  of results.  Although  the  results  may  be  similar,  for  the  reasons 
discussed  above,  it  will  be  the  TSLS  parameter estimates  which will  be  used  for  the 
analysis to be conducted in the subsequent sections. 
TABLE 1:  WAGE  EQUATION  COEFFICIENTS  FOR  THE  U.S..  JAPAN.  EC15, 
W.GERMANY. FRANCE. ITALY AND THE UK 
ESTIMATION METHOD- TSLS* 
CONSTANT  INFLATION  UNEMPLOYMENT  PRODUCT- TERMS OF  R- D-W 
IVITY  TRADE  SQUARED  STAT. 
(Level**)  (change 
In) 
UNITED  5.48  .98  -.73  -.58  .29  -.75  .86  2.18 
STATES  (0.68)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.24)  (0.14)  (0.22) 
JAPAN  13.15  .61  -4.28  - .20  -.55  .95  1.42 
(5.72)  (0.30)  (2.04)  (0.17)  (0.21) 
EUROPEAN  6.03  .91  -.50  -.45  .03  -1.07  .97  2.00 
COMMUNITY  (1.22)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.28)  (0.15)  (0.24) 
- W.GERMANY  3.31  .89  -.49  - .43  -1.27  .88  2.22 
(1.77)  (0.27)  (0.17)  (0.20)  (0.26) 
-FRANCE  4.96  1.03  -.43  - .13  -.54  .95  2.10 
(1.53)  (0.09)  (0.1 0)  (0.21)  (0.21) 
-ITALY  6.57  .95  -.65  -1.12  .46  -1.53  .93  2.21 
(2.48)  (0.07)  (0.24)  (0.68)  (0.20)  (0.36) 
-UK  4.09  .79  -.18  -.18  .30  -1.50  .91  1.84 
(2.50)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.24) 
*  Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
**  A  low  coefficient  on  the  unemployment  variable  translates  into  a  high 
unemployment cost in terms of  reducing inflation. (4) 
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All the equations perform satisfactorily on the basis of  the standard statistical criteria.  The 
overall  equation  is  a  good  fit  explaining  a  large  proportion  of the  variation  in  the 
dependent  variable  (i.e.  wage  inflation)  and  virtually  all  the  coefficients  are  not  only 
correctly signed in accordance with a priori theoretical guidance for the expected direction 
of causality  but  are  statistically  well  determined  in  terms  of low  standard  errors  and 
confidence intervals. 
The  good  statistical  and  explanatory  performance  of the  above  estimated  equations 
suggests  that  the  augmented  Phillips  curve  framework  is  a  satisfactory  method  for 
describing the short-run wage determination process in the countries concerned. 
STABILITY OF THE EQUATION ESTIMATES:  While  the  equations  appear to 
perform satisfactorily, it is nevertheless important to examine the stability of  the estimated 
equations given not only the substantial shifts in economic policy which occurred over the 
period but also the fact that there was a wide range of  variation over the estimation period 
in the growth of wages, inflation and unemployment (see Poret-1990).  Such a wide and 
sharp  variation  in  the  variables  concerned  obviously  gives  rise  to  the  question  as  to 
whether the underlying process of wage determination has changed.  An examination of 
the underlying stability of this relationship can be carried out by using the technique of. 
recursive regressions and with standard Chow Tests. 
The recursive least squares procedures provide detailed pictures of the evolution of the 
estimated relationship  by  extending  the  sample  one observation at  a  time  and  as  such 
provide an important source of information in testing for structural change in the model. 
Based  on  the  recursive  OLS  regression  residuals,  the  CUSUM  test  (based  on  the 
cumulative  sum  of the  residuals)  and  the  CUSUM of Squares  Test  (based  on  the 
cumulative  sum  of the  squared  recursive  residuals)  test  the  null  hypothesis  that  the 
estimated coefficients from the different sub-samples are constant. 
The stability of  the 2SLS equations were also tested using the standard Chow Tests which 
tested the null hypothesis of equation stability over the period prior to  1979  compared 
with the period from  1980  onwards.  1979 was an  obvious point at which a  break in 
structure  might  have  been  expected  to take  place  following  the  establishment  of the 
European Monetary System (EMS).  In the Chow forecast test, the equation is estimated 
using the observations up to 1979 and this equation is then used to predict the values of 
the dependent variable  (wage growth)  over the period  1980-1994.  If there  are  large 
discrepancies between the predicted and actual values then the stability of the estimated 
equation is  called  into  question.  In the  Chow Breakpoint  Test,  the total  number  of 
observations are divided into two or more subsets with the equation under review fitted 
separately to each sub-sample.  The objective in this case is to test whether the coefficient 
vector for the wage equation may be regarded as constant over the subsets i.e.  over the 
periods 1961-1979 and 1980-1994. 
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING STABILITY:  Do the results of these stability tests 
support the  view  that there  was  a  structural  break  in  wage  behaviour  in  the  1980s? 
Unfortunately,  the  evidence  in  relation  to  the  four  stability  tests  described  above  is 
inconclusive with the Cusum and  Cusum of Squares tests suggesting that the estimated 
equations are in  general stable (i.e.  that there was no break in behaviour) but with the 
results of  the Chow tests pointing to possible equation instability, at least for some of  the 
countries  in  question  (i.e.  the  null  hypothesis  of stability  over  the  two  subsets  of 
observations could not be definitively accepted). -24-
Given the inconclusiveness of the stability tests,  additional work will  clearly have to be 
undertaken  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  the  wage  moderation  of the  1980s  can  be 
explained simply by reference to external factors, such as the depressed commodity prices 
of  that period or to the collapse in oil prices in 1986, or whether more fundamental factors 
were  at work i.e.  factors  indicative  of a  structural  change?
6  Such work  must  try  to 
overcome some of the  serious limitations of the aggregate wage equations estimated 
above, especially the fact that they ignore or inadequately model key features of  the wage 
formation process such as union power or institutional changes such as a hardening of  the 
ERM commitment. 
6 
A  fundamental change in wage formation could occur for a number of  reasons: 
1>  price expectations, which are a crucial component of wage claims may change in response to the  greater 
credibility of a country's anti-inflationary policies.  The widespread adoption of non-accommodating policies in 
the early 1 980s is often represented as a policy regime change which could have fundamentally modified wage 
determination relationships; 
1>  the wage determination process may become more responsive to rates of unemployment; and 
1>  wage behaviour could be affected by reductions in union militancy and coverage. SECTION 3 
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LABOUR MARKET ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS: 
QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF WAGE FLEXffiiLITY 
AND EMPLOYMENT ADAPTABILITY
7 
It is important before going on to discuss the issue of equilibrium unemployment to look 
at the operation of the labour· market  adjustment  mechanisms  and  to distinguish  these 
mechanisms from the question of equilibrium unemployment.  This is essential in terms of 
understanding the adjustment dynamics  in the labour market (i.e.  the speed with which 
unemployment moves to its equilibrium) which is  a separate issue to that of equilibrium 
unemployment (see Turner, Richardson and Rauffet 1993). 
Adjustment dynamics  highlight  the  importance  of lagged  effects  in  adjustment  (i.e. 
adjustment is not automatic. They refer to the speed of  adjustment of  the labour market to 
temporary (i.e. cyclical) and permanent (i.e. structural) shocks. 
If a  country's  labour  market  exhibits  considerable  sluggishness  in  adjustment  to  a 
temporary  or permanent  change  in  economic  conditions  then this  will  have  important 
implications in terms of  the cost and duration of  the adjustment process, for example; 
•  adjustment  to  temporary  shocks  to  labour  demand  such  as  increases  in 
unemployment  following  a  cyclical  slowdown  will  result  in  unemployment 
persisting at the higher level for a longer period; 
•  adjustment  to permanent shocks to  labour demand such  as,  for  example,  a 
lower world demand for unskilled workers,  is  significantly delayed by the slow 
adjustment mechanisms - it takes a considerably longer time  to reach the new 
long-run equilibrium. 
This section looks at the two-key labour market adjustment mechanisms, wage flexibility 
and employment adaptability, in an attempt to draw some conclusions regarding the health 
of  the Community's adjustment mechanisms compared with those prevailing in the US and 
Japan.  These adjustment mechanisms  are  crucial to a smooth market clearing  process 
with the greater the degree of clogging of these mechanisms,  the greater the degree of 
unemployment persistence. 
The purpose of  this present section therefore is to present an analysis of  the dynamic wage 
adjustment  process in  the  Community,  the US  and  Japan using  the  augmented Phillips 
curve  framework  developed  in  the  previous  section  and  to  look  at  the  issue  of 
employment  adaptability.  This  Phillips  curve  framework  is  particularly  useful  in 
highlighting the two essential features of the wage adjustment process in the Community 
namely  the  existence  of a  substantial  degree  of real  wage  rigidity  and  the  related 
phenomenon of rising NAIRU  s and  hysteresis.  Internationally comparable estimates of 
nominal and real wage flexibility are useful in helping to explain the large variations over 
recent decades in the unemployment performances of the US, Japan and the four largest 
Community economies, namely W.Germany, France, Italy and the UK. 
Labour market clearing (adjustment) can only occur through the adjustment of real  wages or an adjustment in 
numbers employed.  Inflexible (rigid)  real  wages or low employment adaptability increase the cost in terms of 
lost  output  and  employment  (increased  unemployment)  and  in  terms  of  the  length  of  the  labour  market 
adjustment process.  Wages  and  employment must therefore become more responsive to changes in labour 
market conditions. -26-
3.1  NOMINAL AND REAL WAGE FLEXffiiLITY 
The  most  commonly  used  method  to  derive  meaningful  cross-country  measures  of 
flexibility  is  to estimate augmented Phillips  curve type wage equations for  each of the 
countries concerned and to use the estimated inflation and unemployment coefficients to 
construct flexibility measures ( see Coe 1985 and Chan-Lee, Coe and Prywes 1987). 
The  equation  results  presented  in  Section 2,  using  the  TSLS  estimation  method,  can 
therefore be used to quantify the extent of  real and nominal rigidities in wage setting. 
•  A high degree of real rigidity  describes  a situation where real wages respond 
little to changes in demand pressure (proxied by unemployment). 
•  Nominal rigidities  arise  when  nominal  wages  respond  slowly  to  changes  in 
pnces. 
Quantitative  measures  for  both  these  concepts  can  be  obtained  from  the  estimated 
parameters from the nominal wage equations. 
The nominal wage flexibility  concept focuses  on the short-run responsiveness of wages 
with respect to prices i.e the extent of nominal inertia in the determination of nominal 
wages.  If  a country's wage determination process is characterised by a slow adjustment of 
wages  to  price  changes,  as  in  the  US  because  of the  long  average  length  of wage 
contracts,  real wages will  be  more flexible  in  the face  of an  inflationary  shock.  This 
nominal wage rigidity  or inertia is  a positive phenomenon and  is  the opposite of real 
wage rigidity.  This  short-run real wage flexibility  is  vitally important since it limits the 
squeeze on profits after a price shock and  consequently the need for shedding labour is 
reduced  i.e.  the  short-run  inflation/unemployment  trade-off  is  more  favourable. 
Consequently, real wage rigidity will be higher the more rapidly nominal wages respond to 
a price shock i.e. the more rapidly indexation, formal or informal, occurs. 
However, the above measure of real wage flexibility is insufficient since it focuses only 
on the elasticity of  wages with respect to prices.  It does not say anything about how the 
level  of unemployment will be affected by  a particular shock which is  probably a more 
appropriate measure of real wage rigidity.  It is more appropriate since we are trying to 
assess the extent to which divergences in unemployment performances can be explained 
by the presence of real wage rigidities following  shocks to an economy.  Consequently, 
the sensitivity of  wages to the unemployment rate must also be looked at, with real wage 
rigidity being measured by the increase in the unemployment rate necessary to neutralise 
the  inflationary  consequences  of  a  real  adverse  shock  i.e.  the  degree  of  non-
accommodation measured in terms of  increases in the unemployment rate.  Consequently, 
the less  sensitive are wages to the unemployment rate,  the higher will  be the measured 
degree of  real wage rigidity. 
In order to produce a comprehensive aggregate wage flexibility indicator it is necessary 
to  produce  a  synthetic  indicator  based  on  the  two  measures  of real  wage  rigidity 
mentioned above i.e.  the elasticity of wages with respect to prices and the sensitivity of 
wages to the unemployment rate.  This comprehensive wage flexibility indicator would, in 
the case of an inflationary supply shock, such as an oil price increase, be therefore a two-
pronged measure of  flexibility capturing both the short-run reaction of  wage earners to the 
terms  of trade loss  and  their reaction to the  changed  labour market  conditions.  This 
"overview" indicator is  constructed simply by dividing the short-run elasticity of money 
wages with respect to consumer prices by the elasticity of money wages with respect to -27-
the unemployment rate.  Consequently, a low elasticity of nominal wages with respect to 
short-run price changes  and  a  high  degree of  responsiveness of wages to changes in 
demand pressure would produce a low value for the "overview" indicator indicating real 
wage flexibility and vice versa. 
In conclusion, therefore, countries with a high value for the ratio of the two elasticities 
can be regarded  as  demonstrating  real  wage  rigidity  with  countries  with  a  low ratio 
indicating real wage flexibility. 
Table  2  below  draws  on the  estimation results  from  the  equations  in  Section 2  and 
constructs short-run and long-run "overview" measures of  real wage rigidity. 
TABLE 2:  SHORT AND LONG-RUN REAL WAGE RIGIDITY
8 
ELASTICITY of NOMINAL WAGES WITH  "OVERVIEW' REAL WAGE 
RESPECT TO  RIGIDITY 
PRICES  UNEMPLOY- SHORT RUN  LONG RUN 
MENT 
SHORT  LONG RUN 
RUN* 
1  2  3  4 =1  + 3  5=2+3 
UNITED  0.09  0.98  -0.73  0.12  1.34 
STATES 
JAPAN  0.33  0.61  -4.28  0.08  0.14 
EUROPEAN  0.52 **  0.91  -0.50  1.04  1.82 
COMMUNITY  -- -- -- -- --
-W.GERMANY  0.50  0.89  -0.49  1.02  1.82 
-FRANCE  0.50  1.03  -0.43  1.16  2.40 
-ITALY  0.40  0.95  -0.65  0.62  1.46 
-UK  0.67  0.79  -0.18  3.72  4.39 
*  Quest estimates: The short-run price elasticity refers to the impact after one quarter 
**  Unweighted average of the four EC countries mentioned 
The main conclusions to be drawn from the above table are as follows: 
•  The short-run responsiveness of  wages with respect to prices is  higher in the 
European Community and in Japan  than in the United States.  This nominal 
wage rigidity in the US,  resulting from  money wages  reacting  slowly  to  price 
changes, brings with it a number of positive advantages such as less rapid price-
wage spiralling  effects  and  less  pressure  on profits  thus reducing the need for 
labour shedding. 
•  Over the longer-run wages eventually follow prices in almost all countries as 
evidenced by the convergence towards unity of  the price coefficients.  This is the 
result one would expect in the absence of money illusion.  The long-run in this 
8 See Coe (1985) -28-
case (i.e. in terms of indexation) is equal to about 6-9 months in the case of the 
EC and Japan and  1 lh-2 years in the case of the US  reflecting the differences in 
the length of  wage contracts. 
•  Estimates  for  the  sensitivity  of wages  to  the  unemployment  rate  show  the 
greatest responsiveness of wages to labour demand  occurring in Japan.  For the 
United States, the empirical results show a slightly stronger reaction to changing 
labour market  pressure than in  the Community  as  a whole  or in the individual 
Member States. 
•  Combining  the  short-run  price  and  unemployment  coefficients
9  to  produce  the 
short-run  "overview"  indicator for real  wage  responsiveness  shows  a  high 
degree of short-run real wage flexibility in both the US  and Japan due essentially 
to a high responsiveness of wages to unemployment in the case of Japan and  a 
slow response of  wage growth to inflation in the case of the US.  A substantially 
more  rigid  picture  appears  for  the  European  countries  as  a  whole  because  of 
relatively rapid indexation and a low cyclical responsiveness of  wages. 
•  In  the  short-run,  therefore,  a non-accommodation of a one percentage point 
price rise would only require unemployment to increase by 0.1  percentage points 
above the natural rate in the first quarter of the adjustment (i.e.  the short-run) to 
prevent an acceleration of  wages in the US and Japan but by 1 percentage point in 
the Community. 
•  Since  the  long-run  inflation  elasticities  are  all  close  to  unity,  the  long-run 
"overview" measure for real wage rigidity only differs from country to country 
on the  basis  of the  differences  in  the  estimated  unemployment  elasticities.  In 
overall terms,  in a long-run comparative-static sense,  unemployment would have 
to increase by 0. 1,  1. 3 and  1. 8 percentage points above the natural rate in Japan, 
the  US  and  the  European  Community  respectively  to  offset  the  inflationary 
consequences  of a  real  shock  which  temporarily  increased  inflation  by  one 
percentage point. 
One word of  warning in relation to the use of the above measures of short and long-run 
real wage rigidity:  not too much reliance  should  be placed  on the absolute  size of the 
elasticities, most attention should be focused on the relative differences across countries. 
This  warning  results  essentially  from  the  fact  that the  above  results  derived  from  the 
estimated  wage  equations  are  sensitive  to  changes  in  specification  and  to  definitional 
differences concerning the activity variable. 
However,  despite these reservations,  it is  safe to conclude on the basis of the short-run 
indicator of real wage rigidity that real wages in the US  and Japan are more flexible than 
in the Community and that using the long-run indicator that differences continue to exist 
but are less pronounced between the US and the Community and that Japan is the country 
which stands out as having the most flexible wages even in the long-run. 
9 
Wage formation may be termed rigid  when the ratio of these two elasticities is high  with, as Graphs 3  and 3a 
show,  high  rigidity  certainly playing  some part in  increasing unemployment.  (A  high  correlation appears to 
exist between rigidity levels and unemployment changes). -29-
REAL WAGE RIGIDITY AND INCREASES IN UNEMPLOYMENT 
Graphs 3 and 3a group the countries shown in Table 2 according to their short-run (Graph 
3)  and  long-run (Graph 3a)  real  wage rigidity  measures  and  compares  them  with  the 
actual and  trend rise in unemployment between  1973  and  1994.  Both graphs reveal  a 
distinct  positive  correlation  between  both  the  rigidity  measures  and  the  relative 
deterioration in the labour market situation of the respective countries.  It would appear 
from these graphs that the non-accommodation of adverse price shocks in conditions of 
real  wage  rigidity  could  carry  substantial  short  and  long-run  consequences  for 
employment.  This  is  in  keeping with the belief that the  presence of a relatively  large 
degree of rigidity in the Community is correspondingly reflected in larger disturbances to 
the real economy following supply or demand shocks than in the US or Japan. 
GRAPH 3: Short-Run Real Wage Rigidity and 
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3.2  EMPLOYMENT ADAPTABILITY 
In  addition  to wage  cost  flexibility,  another  indicator  of the underlying  health  of an 
economy's adjustment processes is the concept of employment adaptability i.e.  the speed 
with which employment adjusts to fluctuations in output.  Consequently,  countries with 
highly  flexible  employment  and  faced  with a  negative  demand  or supply  shock would 
respond with a rapid shake-out in the numbers employed and a consequent sharp rise in 
unemployment.  The latter would in turn provoke a stronger response in terms of  nominal 
wage adjustment compared with a country where employment is more secure or rigid. 
It is  important to stress that this is  a very rough measure of  employment adaptability 
since it only refers to units of  labour employed and makes no allowance for adjustment in 
terms of  the numbers of  hours worked.  This is particularly important in, for example, the 
case of  Japan where a downturn in labour demand has traditionally been reflected more in 
the number of  hours worked than in the shedding of  labour. 
Employment adaptability can be measured 
10  by calculating the output coefficient b in the 
following  equation  which  essentially  measures  the  elasticity  of labour  productivity 
advances with respect to output growth : 
Lab.Prod =a+ b*OUTPUT GROWTHt + c* OUTPUT GROWTH t-1 
If  the b coefficient is low, this is indicative that employment is highly flexible. 
TABLE 3:  EMPLOYMENT ADADPABILITY INDICATOR* 
(The lower the value the greater the adaptability) 
* 
us  .42** 
JAPAN  .90 
EC 15  .76 
- W.  GERMANY  .68 





It must be stressed that this indicator provides only a rough  overview of the situation since it 
does not adjust for differences in working time 
**  This  indicator shows that if output declines  by  1 percent  in  the  U.S.  then  labour productivity 
goes  down  by  .42  and  consequently  employment  declines  by  .58  whereas  in  Japan  a 
1 percent decline in output leads only to a 0.1  percent fall in the numbers employed. 
10  See  OECD  (1989)  "Economies  in  Transition:  Structural  Adjustment  in  OECD  Countries"  and  the  OECD  Economic 
Survey for Austria 1987/1988 (5) 
-31-
Table 3 shows the b coefficient estimates for the US, Japan, the EC and the four largest 
EC countries which indicates clearly that the US has the most adaptable employees with 
Japan at the  other extreme  and  the  Community  as  a whole,  as  well  as  the  individual 
Member States, in an intermediate position. 
WAGE FLEXffiiLITY AND EMPLOYMENT ADAPTABILITY: It is interesting to 
combine the wage flexibility and employment adaptability indicators since as Table 4 and 
Graph 4 indicate there would appear to be  a trade-off between the two  concepts with 









EMPLOYMENT  ADAPTABILITY  AND  REAL  WAGE 
FLEXffiiLITY 
Employment Adaptability  Long-run Real Wage 
Flexibility* 
.42  1.34 
.90  0.14 
.76  1.82 
.68  1.82 
.75  2.40 
.85  1.46 
.74  4.39 
*The lower the value the greater the flexibility. 
It would appear from this table that economies, such as Japan, which are characterised 
by highly flexible real wages in the face of  disturbances can better accommodate some 
degree of  labour hoarding.  Output can remain profitable despite rigidity in employment 
adjustment since wages are so  flexible.  Wage flexibility  ensures viability  and  permits a 
greater level of  employment to be maintained in the event of  an adverse shock. 
In the case of  the US, even though real wage flexibility is not substantially different to that 
in the Community,  this is  counterbalanced by  a high degree of  employment flexibility 
which reflects a large number of factors including the paucity of hiring/firing legislation 
(see Annex 5 on a comparison of US and Community employment performances and the 
role played by labour market flexibility).  In the event of a downturn, therefore, in the US, 
the employment fallout would lead to a pronounced rise in unemployment which in turn 
would exert a relatively strong moderating influence on wage developments. 
The  "worst  of both  worlds",  of  course,  is  where  a  country's  labour  market  is 
characterised  by  both  inflexible  employment  and  rigid  real  wages.  The  viability  of 
operations  is  severely  compromised  if neither  the  price  of labour  nor  the  quantity 
employed can be flexibly adjusted to meet the demands of changing operating conditions. 
An absence of  voluntary flexibility both with regard to price and quantity leads inevitably -32-
to  involuntary  adjustment  ranging  from  a  scaling  down  of operations  to  large-scale 
redundancies associated with the termination of  unprofitable operations. 
This  "worse of  both worlds" scenario would appear to accurately reflect the situation 
pertaining in  the  Community  and  may  partly  explain  why  the  latter  area  has  only 
managed an employment growth rate of 12 per cent since 1960 compared with increases 
of  45 percent for Japan and 87 percent in the US. 
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A country's job creation performance is in effect the best reflection of  the underlying 
health of  an economy's labour market.  Prima facie,  therefore, EC labour markets are 
functioning badly relative to those in Japan and the US  due to inflexible real wages and 
employment rigidity.  The US and Japanese labour markets would appear to be in a better 
position to weather any negative external supply or deflationary demand shocks than those 
in the Community due to a high degree of wage flexibility  in the case of Japan and to 
employment flexibility in the case of  the US. 
Given  the  political  and  social  difficulties  associated  with  highly  flexible  employment 
arrangements it  would be more appropriate for the Community to  aim for a higher 
degree  of real  wage flexibility.  When  real  wage  flexibility  is  high  (i.e.  when  the 
moderating influence of  rising unemployment on wage settlements is relatively strong), the 
fall in profitability, output and employment following a shock is normally small and short-
lived.  In other words,  the rise  in  unemployment  required  to  both reduce inflation  (i.e. 
wage inflation) and to restore profit margins to the levels pertaining before the shock is -33-
smaller when real wages are flexible.  Therefore, with the speedy and complete adjustment 
to demand or supply side shocks occurring through a high degree of real wage flexibility, 
there is less onus on an economy to adjust employment levels in the face of such shocks. 
In a sense, therefore, countries can live with a high degree of employment rigidity if its 
aggregate real wage flexibility is high e.g. Japan
11
. 
11  In  Japan,  it  would  appear that employment  is  simultaneously  rather  resilient  to  changes  in  output  growth 
(negative shocks to labour demand tend to be reflected in changes in the number of hours worked rather than 
in the numbers employed)  while,  at the same time, Japanese wage-setting procedures appear to be strongly 
influenced by competitiveness considerations with unions anxious not to price their members out of markets. 
Consequently, the Japanese economy has not been affected to the same extent as other countries by wage-
price spirals following  external inflationary  shocks.  For  a  major trading  nation such as Japan,  international 
competitiveness is a crucial determinant of employment growth over the medium-term with the observed high 
degree of employment stability in that country apparently being compensated for by greater wage restraint on 
behalf of employees.  Therefore, it  is true to say that with this type of "labour hoarding"  by Japanese firms 
that at times of depressed or sluggish economic conditions that the slack in  the labour market is  higher than 
that reflected in the official unemployment figures. -34-
SECTION 4:  INTERNATIONAL  COMPARISON  OF  OVERALL  LABOUR 
MARKET FLEXffiiLITY-EOUILffiRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT 
The  last  section  showed  clearly  that  the  Community's  labour  market  adjustment 
mechanisms of wage flexibility  and  employment adaptability compare poorly with those 
pertaining internationally.  These mechanisms refer essentially to the  speed with which 
disequilibrium unemployment moves to its equilibrium rate.  This section will look at the 
related  issue  of the  equilibrium  rate  of unemployment  and  especially  the  question  of 
whether equilibrium rates have changed over time in the countries examined.  The concept 
of  the NAIRU was introduced to define that level of  unemployment which persisted even 
when the labour market is in equilibrium i.e.  the equilibrium rate of unemployment (see 
Annex 4  for  a  short  overview  of the  concepts  of equilibrium  and  disequilibrium 
unemployment). 
4.1  NAIRU CALCULATIONS 
The concept of  the natural rate of  unemployment encapsulates the idea that a natural level 
of unemployment persists even when the labour market is in equilibrium.  In the absence 
of  a perfectly competitive labour market this "natural" level of  unemployment corresponds 
therefore to the amount  of frictional  and  structural unemployment  which  continues  to 
exist in an economy even when the supply and demand for labour are in balance. 
As  with the estimates for real wage flexibility  in the last section,  the most widely used 
method for  calculating the NAIRU is  the  one which uses  the  expectations-augmented 
Phillips curve approach.  While the NAIRU is a useful theoretical concept, its empirical 
difficulties such as  the inaccuracies in measuring it and its variability over time limits its 
usefulness in terms of  macroeconomic policy-making. 
12 
I 
However,  NAIRU  calculations  can  be  used  as  an  overview  indicator  of international 
differences in  overall labour market flexibility  on the  assumption that the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve for each of  the countries concerned has : 
•  the same  functional form; 
•  has comparable data for the variables used (i.e.  there are no definitional differences); 
and 
•  uses the same estimation period. 
The estimated wage equations (2SLS) in  Section 2 meet the 3 criteria mentioned above 
and  thereby  qualify  as  an  appropriate  basis  for  calculating  internationally  comparable 
NAIRUs  for  the  US,  Japan,  EC 15,  W.Germany,  France,  Italy  and  the  UK.  These 
NAIRU calculations will be used to provide a very useful picture of  the relative degree of 
12  It  should  be stressed,  however, that interpreting  changes in  NAIRUs  should  be done  with caution  not only 
because of the unreliability of the estimates but more importantly because of the notable feature that NAIRUs 
appear to have increased the most in  countries where the actual unemployment rate has also increased by the 
greatest  amount.  This  appears  to  suggest  that  the  NAIRU  gravitates  towards  the  prevailing  rate  of 
unemployment and therefore that the downward pressure which high rates of unemployment exert on wages 
tends to decline over time.  The most common explanation for this phenomenon of shock-induced increases in 
unemployment  having  a  weak tendency  to  fall  back to  earlier  levels  is  the  idea  of  "hysteresis"  which  is 
discussed more fully  in  Section 5.  The essential point is that if  one accepts the idea of  hysteresis i.e. that 
rises in  actual unemployment causes a  rise in  equilibrium unemployment, then one would have to be sceptical 
about whether NAIRUs provide good guides to inflationary pressure. -35-
rigidity or malfunctioning among these respective labour markets since the higher the level 
of the NAIRU the greater the labour market problems and difficulties that an individual 
country or region faces. 
One last  aspect of the NAIRU concept needs  to be  stressed  because  it  is  particularly 
pertinent  in  the  case  of the  Community.  The  term  "natural"  or  equilibrium  rate  of 
unemployment appears to suggest not only that the NAIRU calculations are constant but 
more importantly that they are incapable of  being shifted due to economic policy changes. 
However, this view is totally misleading since the natural rate of  unemployment is capable 
of  being influenced by economic policy and it is not immutable over time as proven by the 
experience of  a large number of  Community economies over the last two decades. 
Increases  in the natural rate  can  arise  due  to  the influence of a  broad variety  of 
factors which have the effect of shifting either the demand or supply curve for labour to 
the left.  A leftward movement of the demand curve for labour could occur for example 
due  to the  introduction of productivity-reducing trade union restrictive  practices,  with 
shifts of  the labour supply curve to the left occurring, for example, due to increases in real 
unemployment benefits.  Both of  the above examples are likely to raise the NAIRU. 
While the above points in relation to the NAIRU need to be taken into account, it is clear 
for our purposes here that the NAIRU can still be used as a  meaningful overview measure 
of cross-country  differences  in  labour  market  flexibility  since  it  embodies  all  possible 
institutional labour market differences between countries. 
If  we take the general specification for the wage equations included in Section 2: 
WAGE= c(l) * PCE + c(2) * UNEMP + c(3) *UNEMPC + c(4) * TOT +c(5) *PROD + 
.£{§1 
This is similar to the specification used by the OECD to compute NAIRU  s for the major 
OECD economies (see COE: OECD Economic Studies N°5,  1985).  Unlike the case for 
estimating wage flexibility where the coefficient on the price variable was allowed to be 
freely  determined,  it  was  decided  to  impose  a  coefficient  of  1
13  for  the  NAIRU 
calculations because of  the inherent desirability of  the homogeneity property.  In a steady 
state (i.e. equilibrium), productivity is growing at its trend rate and the unemployment rate 
is  at its natural rate.  Both trend productivity and  the natural rate,  as  in  Section 2,  are 
included  in  the  constant term.  Consequently,  the  above  equation  can be  arranged  to 
compute the NAIRU as follows: 
NAIRU = (c6 - 0 - c5) *change in trend productivitvlc2 
The  natural  rates  computed  by  using  the  above  re-arranged  augmented  Phillips  curve 
equation are given in Table 5 and in Graphs 5 and 6. 
13 
The implication of the coefficient being less than 1 is that the long-run Phillips curve ceases to be vertical and 
therefore unemployment can be kept below the NAIRU  without accelerating inflation. -36-
TABLES 
NAIRU ESTIMATES 1970-1994* 
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1994 
UNITED STATES  6.4  7.0  7.1  6.8  6.7  6.5 
JAPAN  1.8  2.3  2.5  2.5  2.7  2.8 
EUROPEAN  4.7  6.8  tl  8.3  8.5  8.5 
COMMUNITY 
-W.GERMANY  2.6  3.8  4.8  4.7  4.6  4.6 
-FRANCE  3.4  5.8  7.0  7.4  7.6  8.2 
-ITALY  6.5  7.9  8.5  8.6  8.4  8.3 
·UK**  6.2  9.2  9.7  9.2  10.8  9.7 
*  It should be noted that for some countries the productivity coefficient is not statistically different from zero and care should 
therefore be taken in drawing inferences from the absolute NAIRU estimates.  Attention should be focussed on the 
relative, not tthe absolute, performance of the countries concerned. 
*  * Estimates in other research work for the UK NAIRU are in some cases lower than the figures presented here.  Given the 
empirical difficulties in measuring this theoretical concept and its variability over time, such differences should not come 
as a major surprise.  Furthermore, it should be stressed that as regards the above estimates that the coefficient on the 
unemployment variable for the UK, which is used in the NAIRU calculation, is not statistically significant although it is 
correctly signed. 
The  overall  conclusion to be  drawn from  the NAIRU estimates  generated  is  that the 
NAIRU has risen  in all areas,  with  the notable exception of the  US,  over the last 
number of  decades i.e.  the level of  unemployment consistent with stable inflation is now 
much  higher  than  before  the  shocks  of the  1970s.  This  general,  almost  global, 
phenomenon is usually explained by the slowdown in the trend of  productivity growth, by 
the large external oil price shocks and by a deterioration in labour market flexibility.  But 
given that all  areas were equally affected by the first two of the latter three factors,  it is 
trends in relation to labour market flexibility which must be examined in order to explain 
the fact that the European Community has been particularly affected with an increase of 
close  to  four  percentage  points  in  the  NAIRU  over  the  period  compared  with  a 
1 percentage point increase in Japan and virtually no change in the case of  the US. 
As  regards  the  situation  in  the  individual  Member  States,  the  NAIRU  figures  would 
suggest that using this measure of structural unemployment that the situation with regard 
to the "hard core" of  unemployment has in effect stabilised in Germany and Italy and that 
it has continued to deteriorate in France.  Finally, little can be concluded from the NAIRU 
estimates for the UK which have  shown a highly  erratic pattern over the period under 
review. -37-
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The  trends  established  for  the  Community,  the  US  and  Japan  in  the  above  NAIRU 
calculations are broadly confirmed by: 
A.  TREND  UNE:MPLOYMENT  DEVELOPMENTS  AS  CALCULATED  USING 
THE RODRICK-PRESCOTT FILTER APPROACH. 
B.  AN ANALYSIS  OF LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT  RATES,  OUTFLOW 
RATES AND BEVERIDGE CURVES. 
C.  OKUNCURVEANALYSIS. 
TREND UNEMPLOYMENT- CALCULATED BY THE RODRICK-PRESCOTT 
FILTER 
The  Hodrick-Prescott  (H-P)  filter  approach  is  a  trend  estimation  method  which 
basically  uses  a  long-run  moving  average  to  detrend  a  particular  series,  in  this  case 
unemployment.  Using the H-P filter is justified for calculating the natural component of 
unemployment since the latter concept assumes that factors affecting the natural rate are 
infrequent and are slow to change. 
The most interesting point to be taken from graphs 7 and  8 which compare the NAIRU 
calculations and the trend unemployment figures is that slow adjustment mechanisms as 
opposed to equilibrium factors would appear to be responsible for the trend increase in 
Community unemployment from the early  1980s  onwards.  This  is  not  a  surprising 
result giving that the relative restrictiveness of the policy stance pertaining on average in 
the Community over the period as a whole led to increases in unemployment which were 
demand  related  and  not  structural.  Interestingly,  this  general  conclusion  for  the 
Community can be directly applied to the cases of Germany,  France and  Italy where a 
substantial  divergence  has  emerged  between  the  NAIRU  and  trend  unemployment 
measures over roughly the same period.  Finally, it is noteworthy to draw attention to the 
fact  that in  the cases  of the US  and  Japan,  that the NAIRU  and  trend unemployment 
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4.2  BEVERIDGE CURVE ANALYSIS 
The Beveridge curves shown in Graph 9 plot out the relationship  between the vacancy 
rate, defined as the number of  vacancies as a proportion of  total employment, and the rate 
of unemployment.  The  Beveridge  curve  is  essentially  an  indicator  of mismatch 
unemployment i.e.  a mismatch between labour supply  and demand due to regional and/or 
skill  differences.  Consequently,  if rising unemployment is  not accompanied by  a falling 
vacancy  rate  then  this  would  be  an  indication  of growing  mismatch  problems  in  an 
economy. 
The Beveridge curves for the UK and  Germany have in  overall terms  shifted  outwards 
over the  last  number  of decades  at  a time  when the  rate of unemployment  increased 
substantially in both countries.  This outward movement could reflect a number of  factors 
including: 
•  changes in labour mobility; 
•  the effect of  changes in the degree of  social protection - (e.g. unemployment 
and social welfare benefits) - on the incentive to work and consequently on the 
intensity of  job search; 
•  human capital wastage because of  both increasing difficulties in gaining relevant 
work experience and due to the increasing average duration of  spells of 
unemployment. 
The above conclusions in relation to the Beveridge curve are backed-up by Tables 6 and 7 
which show long-term unemployment rates and outflow rates from unemployment for the 
US,  Japan and  the  Community.  The  high proportion of long-term unemployed in the 
overall  unemployment  total  for  the  Community  and  the  low  outflow  rates  are  also 
suggestive, as are the Beveridge curves, of  growing mismatch problems, reduced intensity 
of  job search and the decay of  human capital. 
TABLE 6  INDICATORS  OF  LABOUR  MARKET  RIGIDITY:  LONG-TERM 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
SHARE OF LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYED IN TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
(in per cent) 
1983  1990  1993 
EUR12  46.6 *  48.6  44.0 
USA  13.3  5.6  8.4 
JAPAN  13.1  19.1  15.4 
* EUR 10 




unemployment rate  USA 
12 
memplayment rate  JAPAN 






2  - - -------- ~-- - - ~-
1961 
0...__  _  __._ __  ....__---.~. __  ...~-_  __.J  0'-__,'--__,  _  __._---~.._---~..._-..~..._...J 
0.3  0.5  0. 7  0.9  1.1  1.3  0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.2  1.4 
vacancy rata  vacancy rata 
12 
unemployment rate  UK 
12 
unemployment rate  W. GERMANY 




Ol..-----"'----l...--l...-...1.....-.J......___JI..-.....J  0'-----'---'----'---1--....1...--.L..----1 
1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.2  1.4  0  0.5 
vacancy rate  vacancy rata -44-
TABLE 7 
INDICATORS OF LABOUR MARKET RIGIDITY: MONTHLY FLOWS OUT OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
(as per cent of unemployment) 
1983  1990  1993 
W.GERMANY  6.2  6.3  9.0 
FRANCE  3.5  3.7  3.4 
ITALY  1.7  2.3  9.5 
UNITED  7.4  9.5  9.3 
KINGDOM 
EUR4*  4.7  5.5  7.8 
USA  37.8  45.7  37.4 
JAPAN  14.8  17.2  17.1 
Source: OECD 
* EUR4, D,F,I,UK 
4.3  OKUN CURVE ANALYSIS 
The Okun curves shown in Graph 10 chart capacity utilisation, which is an indicator of  the 
intensity  of capital  use,  against  the  unemployment  rate  which  is  an  indicator  of the 
intensity of  labour use.  It is evident from these charts that the trend traced by the OKUN 
curve for the Community is more clearly upwards compared with that for either the US or 
Japan.  Consequently,  in the  Community,  a given rate of capacity utilisation has  been 
associated over time with higher and higher rates of  unemployment.  The upward shift of 
the Okun curve is generally perceived to be a sign of  insufficient labour market flexibility, 
implying  an  increase  therefore  in  the  NAIRU  (see  OECD  -1989:  Economies  in 
Transition).
14 
This upward movement of the OKUN curve would appear not to be due to inadequate 
investment  nor  to  depressed  demand  but  to  differences  in  the  type  of investment 
undertaken.  To illustrate this contentious conclusion, Graph 11  compares the US and the 
Community with regard to developments in real GDP,  capital stock and the capital-
labour ratio.  This graph suggests that neither a lack of  demand growth (real GDP has 
14 
Wage  formation  rigidities  appear  to  have  been  a  major  factor  in  the  worsening  relationship  between 
employment and production capacity utilisation  rates and  consequently the growth in  unemployment.  With 
widespread de facto  index  linking,  allied  to the  rigidity  of  real  wages,  adjustment to  the  oil  shocks  of the 
1 970s had to be borne by businesses by the erosion of profit margins.  Reaction to reduced profitability and 
the appearance of real  wage gaps in  some cases led to company failures and to a  general effort to enhance 
productivity through capital/labour substitution. -45-
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grown by roughly equivalent amounts in both areas) nor insufficient investment, reflected 
in the growth of  the capital stock, can be postulated as credible explanations for the higher 
trend increase in unemployment and  lower employment growth in the Community over 
the period. 
The graph suggests that a more plausible explanation lies  in  an  analysis  of the type of 
investment which took place.  The third section of the graph indicates that Community 
investment patterns have been showing an increasing preference for the labour  -saving and 
capital  deepening  variety  (i.e.  increasing  the  capital-intensity  of production)  with  the 
amount  of capital  employed  per employee  increasing  sharply  over the  period.  Higher 
levels of capital per employee in the Community explain the fact that labour productivity 
rather than  employment  growth was  the  major  driving  force  behind  the  Community's 
output performance over the period.  The slower rate of  increase in the US' capital-output 
ratio suggests, on the other hand, that the investment trend in the US was more towards 
capacity-expanding investment, i.e. capital widening, rather than capital deepening. 
This latter point in relation to differences in the type of investment undertaken in the two 
areas  is  of fundamental  importance  to  the  whole  issue  of labour  market  flexibility. 
Because of this  importance,  it  is  crucial to look in more detail  at this  phenomenon of 
capital-deepening investment in the Community which, in effect, results in the substitution 
of capital for labour.  Is  this capital/labour substitution process more the  result  of real 
wage developments or inflexible labour markets in the Community?  The next section will 
look at these questions. 
4.4  CAPITAL/LABOUR  SUBSTITUTION:  TREND  TOWARDS  CAPITAL-
DEEPENING INVESTMENT IN THE COMMUNITY 
If the increase in national output can be produced with a relatively larger input of labour 
and  a relatively smaller input of capital then clearly growth becomes more employment 
creating.  The substitution of labour for capital curbs the rise in the average productivity 
of labour in  the economy as  a whole  since the capital intensity of production declines. 
The slower rise in capital intensity relative to the Community between the 1960s and the 
period 1970-93 (Graph 12) was obviously a key factor in explaining the slowdown in US 
productivity  growth  over  the  same  period.  This  decreased  capital  intensity  is  also 
confirmed  by  a  comparison  of developments  in  the  capital-output  ratio  in  the  US 
(Graph 13) and the Community over the period in question. -48-
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Why  has  US  production  become  less  capital  intensive  while  the  opposite  trend  has 
emerged in the Community?  Graphs 14 and  15  show developments in real compensation, 
productivity and labour shares in the U.S. and the Community over the period in question 
which throw some light on this issue of  capital intensity. -49-
Profit maximising firms reallocate resources in response both to changes in relative factor 
prices and to changes in the productivity of  those factors.  Productivity, in turn,  depends 
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on technical progress in relation to physical capital and training and education in relation 
to human capital.  While governments may have some influence on the choice between the 
factors of  production capital and labour, both in terms of  relative factor prices and human 
capital  improvements,  it  would  appear from  the  literature  (see,  for  example,  Baumol-
1986) that no such influence is  possible in relation to technical progress.  According to 
this  literature  a  secular  convergence  trend  exists  amongst  the  major  industrialised 
countries  with  regard  to  technology  and  productivity  levels.  Technological  diffUsion 
Graph 15 
Wage share in value added in the US and in the EC* 








*EC includes the countries 8 OK WD F I L NL and from 1977 onwards also P 
Source: Commission services, Annual macro economic data base DG II -50-
would appear to be a random process with the result that individual countries or groups of 
countries cannot choose between high productivity versus low productivity growth paths 
or between high employment/low employment growth outcomes. 
However, even though technological diffusion may be a random process, the speed with 
which this process occurs can be affected by government policy decisions since the speed 
of diffusion depends to a large extent on the relative cost or attractiveness of the factors 
of  production capital and labour.  Therefore, anything which has the effect of  reducing the 
relative attractiveness of labour,  be it a slowdown in the overall rate of increase in the 
supply of labour, a shortage of particular types of labour, a lack of investment in training 
and education, a relatively immobile labour force or a wage formation process which fails 
to  generate  flexible  and  differentiated  wage  settlements,  then  the  greater  will  be  the 
incentive to increase the capital intensity of  the production process in question. 
Some of  the latter factors, which essentially reflect the underlying degree of  labour market 
flexibility  in  an  economy,  may  have  been  responsible  for  capital  being  increasingly 
substituted for labour in the Community over the period analysed (i.e.  increased capital 
intensity). 
OVERALL CONCLUSION 
The various proxy measures of structural unemployment (NAIRU, Beveridge and Okun 
Curves)  constructed in  this  section  show  clearly  that there has  been a strong upward 
trend for the Community since  the early  1970s.  In contrast there has  been no  trend 
increase in US unemployment over the same period despite both experiencing substantial 
economic shocks (as in the case of the Community) and witnessing increases in both its 
labour force and employment of  close to 50 percent over the period as a whole (compared 
with  18% and  5% respectively  in  the  case  of the  Community).  In  addition,  other 
indications of labour market rigidity such as  long-term unemployment and outflow rates 
paint  a  similarly  negative  overall  picture  for  the  Community.  As  regards  Japan,  the 
increase in trend unemployment has been small and has occurred from a low base. -51-
SECTION 5:  POLICY ISSUES AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The previous sections have pointed to significant inefficiencies in the functioning  of the 
Community's  labour  market.  Section  3  highlighted  the  inflexible  nature  of wage  and 
employment adjustment.  Section 4 showed clearly that overall labour market flexibility in 
the Community is inferior to that existing in either the US or Japan as reflected in various 
measures of structural unemployment which have been increasing steadily from cycle to 
cycle.  This concluding section has two main objectives: 
A.  TO  EXAMINE  THE  POLICY  ISSUE  OF  WHETHER  THE  TREND  RISE  IN 
COMMUNITY  UNEMPLOYMENT  IS  A  HYSTERESIS  OR  SLOW  ADJUSTMENT 
PROBLEM; AND 
B.  TO DISCUSS THE IMPORTANT POLICY IMPLICATIONS IDGHLIGHTED BY THE 
ANALYSIS, IN PARTICULAR THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE OF MACRO/ MICRO 
POLICIES  IN  ANY  SOLUTION  TO  THE  COMMUNITY'S  UNEMPLOYMENT 
PROBLEM. 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The  previous  sections  have  tentatively  concluded  that  in  the  longer  run  it  is  those 
economies with less flexible labour markets and greater wage rigidities which appear to 
experience greater persistence in,  or higher equilibrium levels of, unemployment.  A high 
degree of labour market flexibility is essential in ensuring the smooth adjustment process 
which  is  needed  to  attenuate  the  size  and  duration  of  adverse  movements  in 
unemployment  associated  with  exogenous  shocks.  Trend  increases  in  Community 
unemployment over the last number of decades point to problems in the Member States 
labour market adjustment mechanisms which need to be addressed if unemployment is to 
be set on a firm downward trajectory. 
Structural, natural or equilibrium unemployment in the Community has been steadily rising 
from  cycle  to  cycle.  The  structural  rate  of unemployment  is  a  long-run  equilibrium 
concept which is determined by the underlying factors affecting the supply and demand for 
labour.  There are no direct measures of structural unemployment since it is  a theoretical 
construct but estimates were derived in the previous section by using the three concepts 
of  the NAIRU, Beveridge curve and Okun curve. 
Estimates  using  these  three  measures  show  that  since  the  late  1960s  structural 
unemployment has increased substantially in the Community, stayed roughly stable in the 
US and in the case of Japan the rate increased by only about one percentage point.  This 
evidence  suggests that the EC's labour market is  becoming  increasingly  inflexible  (i.e. 
adjusts very slowly to shocks and policy changes). 
A broad range of  factors appear to be inhibiting greater flexibility in the Community's 
labour market and  must bear a lot of the responsibility for the increase in  Community 
structural unemployment over the period in  question.  The detailed reasons behind this 
malfunctioning of  the Community's labour markets is not gone into in the main text but is 
discussed in some detail in Annex 5 (see also Matthes/Todd 1994). -52-
POLICY DEBATE:  IS  THE  TREND  RISE  IN  COMMUNITY 
UNEMPLOYMENT A  HYSTERESIS (I.E.  EOUILffiRIUMl OR 
SLOW ADJUSTMENT (I.E. DISEQUILffiRIUM) PROBLEM?
15 
A  large  number  of commentators  have  found  it  hard  to  accept  that  the  substantial 
deterioration  in  structural  unemployment  in  the  Community  which  has  occurred,  as 
measured by the NAIRU etc., could be due totally to changes in the determinants of the 
equilibrium rate of  unemployment.  Their suspicions have led to an alternative thesis being 
put forward  which  suggests  that the  past level  of actual  unemployment  may  strongly 
influence  the  current  rate  of equilibrium  unemployment  - the  idea  of hysteresis. 
Hysteresis, it is postulated, can occur for a large variety of reasons including the erosion 
of  human skills,  as  a result of long periods without employment,  and  insider-outsider 
phenomena
16  and  the  "screening  device"  phenomenon  i.e.  "unemployed  seen  as 
unemployable". 
It is important from an analytical and policy point of view to distinguish clearly between 





Pure hysteresis  effectively  means  "no  adjustment"  and  calls  into  question the 
idea that a unique level of equilibrium unemployment exists since a rise in actual 
unemployment  would  provoke  a  rise  in  equilibrium  unemployment.  In 
circumstances  of "pure"  hysteresis,  the  NAIRU  concept  becomes  useless  for 
policy purposes. 
"Partial" hysteresis on the other hand is a "disequilibrium" phenomenon and is a 
more appealing explanation for the trend rise in unemployment because it retains 
the theoretically sound principle of  an equilibrium rate of  unemployment. 
Blanchard and Summers "Beyond the natural Rate Hypothesis", (1988).  "On the "classical" view, considered 
by  Sargent,  disinflation,  if  credible,  is  achievable  at  little  cost  in  unemployment.  On  the  alternative 
"Keynesian" view, even credible disinflation is likely to increase unemployment for some time because of the 
momentum  caused  by  overlapping  price  and  wage decisions.  European  experience  of the  1980s poses  a 
profound challenge to standard Keynesian and Classical theories of macroeconomic fluctuations - the natural 
rate hypothesis underlies much of both Keynesian and Classical macroeconomics.  What is required is a theory 
of unemployment in  which unemployment, far from returning to a  stable equilibrium - or "natural rate" - over 
time, is  instead strongly dependent on history.  We refer to such an equilibrium as a  "fragile equilibrium", to 
highlight  the sensitive dependence  of  unemployment on current and  past events.  Developing  a  theory  of 
fragile  equilibrium  involves  questioning and  perhaps discarding traditional  presumptions  about the  slopes  of 
labour demand and supply curves". 
The  wage  bargaining  process  involves  parties  which  primarily  reflect  the  interests  of  the  insiders  (the 
employed),  the process does not allow the outsiders (the  unemployed)  to  influence  the  wage  negotiations. 
Consequently,  the  greater the  prevalence  of  such  a  system of  wage  bargaining  the  weaker the  effect  of 
unemployment on  wage  growth  with  high  unemployment  persisting since  it  has  only  a  weak tendency  to 
correct itself by means of wage restraint.  Therefore any measures, such as greater recourse to centralised 
bargaining or more generous levels of social protection, which increase the wage bargaining power of insiders 
will  probably result in  an additional delay in  the adjustment of wages to adverse labour market conditions.  It 
should be noted that highly centralised wage bargaining helps insiders by preventing outsiders from exerting a 
major influence on wage growth in  particular segments of the labour market.  If  most wages in  an economy 
are required to move together, this means that wage adjustment in  particular segments of the market namely 
regions,  sectors or skill  groups which are suffering from above average rates of unemployment is  prevented 
from  making  the  necessary  correction to  bring  unemployment down.  In  other  words  centrally  negotiated 
settlements increase wage rigidity by weakening the effect of particular segments of unemployment on wage 
growth.  While  such  agreements  have  been  used  with  some  success  by  a  number  of  countries  to  limit 
inflationary pressures, this positive aspect has to be balanced against the rigidities that centrally determined 
pay increases introduce into the labour market through reducing the responsiveness of wages to shifts in the 
relative demand for labour.  Enhanced social protection works in the same way by reducing the intensity of job 
search of the unemployed and in  this way discouraging outsiders from exerting a  major downward influence 
on wages, thereby slowing the adjustment of unemployment and increasing persistence. -53-
"Partial" hysteresis refers essenttally to "slow adjustment" processes where unemployment 
persistence mechanisms result in unemployment remaining above its long-run equilibrium 
level  for  a  long  period  following  a  disturbance.  Persistent unemployment,  under this 
definition, will be gradually removed over time through a slow process of real wage and 
employment adjustment which will eventually result in equilibrium being restored to the 
labour market. 
"Partial"  hysteresis  essentially  means  therefore  that  the  adjustment  process  in  the 
Community has become more drawn out than in the past because the adjustment process 
has  been  increasingly  clogged  up  by  ''persistence"  mechanisms  (Elmeskov  and 
MacFarlan 1993).  Therefore, since the duration (and the costs) ofthe adjustment process 
is longer than in the past, this has led commentators to misinterpret this slow adjustment 
of  the labour market as being an equilibrium as opposed to a disequilibrium phenomenon. 
If one  accepts  this  view  then  the  rise  in  the  NAIRU  is  not  simply  an  equilibrium 
phenomenon  but  also  reflects  a  large  element  of disequilibrium  unemployment  which 
because of  hysteresis effects has slowed down the adjustment process thereby leading to a 
trend increase in non-cyclical unemployment. 
Finally, it is important to stress that, while under this scenario the trend rise is not simply a 
structural problem, the slower adjustment problem also represents a serious deterioration 
in labour market flexibility  and  a slower and  higher cost transition back to  equilibrium 
unemployment.  Consequently,  although the  question of whether the trend  increase  in 
Community unemployment is either an equilibrium or slow adjustment problem may not 
be  that  important  analytically  (since  both  problems  indicate  serious  labour  market 
malfunctioning) it does have serious implications in policy terms. 
EVIDENCE OF SLOW ADJUSTMENT I PERSISTENCE MECHANISMS: There 
is  a substantial amount of empirical evidence to back up the view that slow adjustment 
may  be an important factor explaining the trend increase in unemployment.  Among the 
latter is the evidence provided by wage-share developments which have declined steadily 
over the  1980s in  a large number of Community countries.  This large .  spift  in income 
distribution induced by unemployment being above its equilibrium level has not as yet led 
to a corresponding increase in the demand for labour as the latter factor of  production has 
become cheaper.  Consequently, the impact of  the downward adjustment of  real wages on 
unemployment has not yet been felt  since the employment response is  occurring with a 
lag. 
In addition to the wage share trend, there is evidence of  slower adjustment in the negative 
real wage gaps opening up in some Member States between real wage and productivity 
developments.  Consequently,  since  the  demand  for  labour  by  firms  depends  on  its 
marginal  productivity,  with  firms  recruiting  up  to  the  point  where  the  marginal 
productivity is  equal to the real wage,  one would expect therefore that with a negative 
real wage gap that the enhanced attractiveness of  labour will soon be reflected in reduced 
capital/labour substitution and reduced unemployment. 
Finally,  the  evidence provided in  Section 2 in relation to the influence of changes in 
unemployment on wages,  also  suggests that the upward trend in unemployment is  not 
totally  an  equilibrium  phenomenon.  If the  upward  movement  was  totally  due  to 
equilibrium factors, then wages should only be responsive to deviations of  unemployment 
from  the  trend.  As  the  equations  in  Section 2  show,  even  though  changes  in 
unemployment  have  an  influence  on wages  in  some  countries,  (most  notably  for  the 
Community as a whole and for Italy)  the coefficient on the overall level ofunemployment -54-
was significant in all countries, with the exception of  the UK, which indicates that overall 
unemployment  continues  to  put  downward  pressure  on  wage  developments  in  those 
countries. 
PERSISTENCE  MECHANISMS  PLACE  "SPEED  LIMITS"  ON 
UNEMPLOYMENT  REDUCTION:  Once  unemployment  has  risen,  persistence 
mechanisms  (erosion  of  human  skills/human  capital  investment,  insider/outsider 
mechanisms)  will  ensure  that  it  cannot  immediately  be  brought  back  to  the  NAIRU 
without a permanent rise in inflation.  To prevent the latter it is  necessary to gradually 
reduce unemployment, thus introducing the idea of "speed limits" on growth. 
"Speed  limits"  on  growth  or hysteresis  is  shown  up  in  the  wage  equations  in  the 
coefficient on the change in unemployment variable.  As regards the estimation results, it · 
is clear as mentioned above that the level of  unemployment continues to have a restraining 
effect on wage growth but that changes in unemployment have an independent influence 
on wages  in  some  countries.  This  means  that  if above  equilibrium  unemployment  is 
reduced too quickly to its equilibrium level,  an acceleration of wage growth may be the 
result. 
These  speed  limits  on unemployment  reduction  could  well  reflect  the  relatively  weak 
impact  on  wage formation  processes  of the  long-term  unemployed.
11  It  is  highly 
significant in this regard that for the Community as a whole that the size of the coefficient 
on the change in unemployment variable is virtually identical to that of the coefficient for 
the level of  unemployment.  This is also the situation pertaining in Italy where the change 
in unemployment is  substantially more important than the level  of unemployment as  an 
explanatory variable in wage developments (see Holmlund  1991).  These developments 
would  suggest that the change in  the unemployment  variable  has  an  independent and 
significant influence on wage developments and that therefore 
11 speed limits 
11  on growth 
could be a problem in some Community countries. 
5.2  IMPORTANT  POLICY  IMPLICATIONS  HIGHLIGHTED  BY  THE 
ANALYSIS:  BALANCE  OF  MACRO/MICRO  POLICIES  IN  ANY 
SOLUTION TO THE UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM 
As  mentioned  earlier in this  section the evidence  is  overwhelming that the ECs labour 
market  has  become  increasingly  inflexible  (i.e.  labour  markets  are  characterised  by 
sluggish adjustment mechanisms in the face of shocks and policy changes) with the result 
that  a  gap  has  opened  up  between  the  speed  of global  technical  change  and  the 
Community's capacity and eagerness to respond and adapt to this new environment. 
17  PROPORTION  OF  LONG-TERM  UNEMPLOYED:  One factor  which  appears to  play  a  large  role  in  the  whole 
phenomenon of hysteresis is  the average length of the unemployment period  experienced.  As  the period  of 
removal from the labour market lengthens, the greater the risk of the main hysteresis/persistence mechanisms 
coming into play.  As high unemployment persists, therefore, it is conceivable that its wage moderating impact 
is  diminished  (i.e.  partial  hysteresis)  or  may  even  disappear  (i.e.  full  hysteresis).  In  fact  all  the  main 
explanations for the existence of persistence mechanisms draw a clear distinction between the long and short-
term  unemployed  in  terms  of  their  effectiveness  as  inflation-reducing  agents  with  the  former  affecting 
aggregate wage growth less than the latter.  Consequently, the greater the share of long-term unemployment 
in  the  overall  total,  the less the downward  pressure  on  wages for  any  given  level  of  unemployment.  As 
regards policy it  is  clear that any solution to the problem of long-term unemployment must be multi-faceted 
with action needed on both welfare benefits/employment taxes and active labour market policies in  order to 
increase the pressure on, the incentives for, and the ability of this group of workers to obtain employment -55-
It is also clear that the trend rise in EC unemployment witnessed over the last two decades 
emanates from  no  one  single  factor.  It is  partially the result  of a  number of adverse 
shocks e.g. the two oil price crises in the seventies, counter inflationary demand policies in 
the  1980s etc.  which had a particularly pronounced effect on EC countries because real 
wage rigidity there was relatively high.  However, these adverse shocks alone were not 
large enough to explain the observed trend increase in actual unemployment during the 
1980s.  Consequently, other factors such as hysteresis effects, would appear to have been 
at play. 
Hysteresis prevents the necessary degree of  real wage adjustment from occurring with the 
result that temporary shocks have permanent or persistent effects on unemployment. 
While  it  can  be  argued  whether  the  above  factors  fully  explain  the  trend  rise  in 
unemployment  over  the  last  twenty  years  it  appears  reasonable  to  conclude  that  the 
explanation for the bulk of the increase in trend unemployment lies in some combination 
of  hysteresis and slow adjustment effects. 
If the above analytical conclusion is accepted it has important implications for the balance 
of  macro I micro policies in any solution to the unemployment problem. 
i)  Firstlv.  it is  clear that macroeconomic  policy  has  an  important  role  to  play  in 
preventing unemployment from rising in the first place thereby reducing the impact 
of hysteresis  effects  which  have  the  effect  of making  it  more  difficult  to  get 
unemployment down once it has been allowed to rise. 
ii)  Secondly,  such an analytical distinction also  supports the widely held  contention 
that supply-side measures, both in terms of  enhancing labour market flexibility and 
active  labour  market  policies,  must  be  the  most  important  part  of any  policy 
programme aimed at both reducing the already high level of  unemployment and of 
avoiding any further trend increases in the total.  Flexibility enhancing measures 
are needed to reduce equilibrium unemployment and to speed up the adjustment 
process,  whereas  active  labour  market policies,  in  combination  with  human 
capital policies, are in particular needed to act on persistent unemployment. 
If, for example, the trend rise is due to hysteresis effects (i.e. an equilibrium phenomenon) 
then macroeconomic policies have little or no role to play in remedying the situation and 
solutions must therefore be found in structural reforms. 
Even  if,  on the  other  hand,  the  trend  rise  in  unemployment  is  due  in  part  to  slow 
adjustment  or  "stickiness" of unemployment following  negative disturbances  to the 
economy,  then  while  macroeconomic  policy  interventions  have  a  role  to  play  in 
attenuating these  disturbances,  structural  policies  have  the key  role in  acting  on those 
factors which speed up the duration of  the real wage and employment adjustment process 
between the occurrence of a shock and the return of  the system to a state of equilibrium 
(e.g.  acting on the slow adjustment of the reservation wage,  minimum wage legislation, 
hiring/firing rules etc.). 
Policies aimed  at enhancing labour market flexibility will improve the functioning  of the 
labour market in a medium-term perspective whereas active labour market policies etc. are 
needed to work on reducing the impact of  important persistence mechanisms in the labour 
market  which  in  particular  have  resulted  in  an  ever-rising  proportion  of long-term 
unemployed in the overall jobless totals. -56-
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ANNEX 1 
INFLATION-UNEMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP: EXPECTATIONS 
AUGMENTED PHILLIPS CURVE- A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
ORIGINAL  PHILLIPS  CURVE:  According  to  the  paper  ("The  Relation  Between 
Unemployment and the Rate of  Change ofMoney Wages in the United Kingdom,  1861-1957") 
published in  1958  by  Bill Phillips,  a New Zealand economist,  there appeared to be a  stable 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment, with periods of low unemployment tending to 
coincide  with  periods  of rising  wage  rates.  The  diagrammatic  depiction  of this  inverse 
relationship  has  since  been  described  as  the  "Phillips  Curve"  which  can  be  written 
mathematically as follows: 
P* = f(u) 
P*  = the inflation rate and U = the unemployment rate. 
This apparent stable trade-off, 1 led policy makers in the 1960s to believe that a "policy-menu" 
existed whereby a choice could be made between high inflation - low unemployment or low 
inflation-high unemployment. 
However, just as  policy-makers began their attempts to exploit this trade-off, the historically 
very stable relationship between these two evils  appeared to break down.  In other words, 
policies which aimed at moving a particular economy along the Phillips curve led in fact to an 
outward  shift  of the  curve  itself i.e.  the  rate  of inflation  associated  with  a  given  rate  of 
unemployment  was  in  fact  rising  leading  in  the  1970s  to  instances  of stagflation,  where 
stagnant output and rising unemployment went hand-in-hand with rising inflation. 
The spectacular breakdown of  the Phillips curve in the 1970s posed the question as to why the 
curve had been so stable over the previous decades.  The most likely answer to this question is 
that the relationship was an accident which resulted from the fact that inflation was both low 
and relatively stable over that period and consequently inflationary expectations were also low 
and  stable.  However, the apparently  stable inverse relationship broke down in the 1970s as 
inflation  became  higher  and  more  volatile  and  inflationary  expectations  were  subject  to 
frequent shocks. 
EXPECTATIONS-AUGMENTED PHILLIPS CURVE:  The empirical breakdown of the 
Phillips  curve relationship  in  the  1970s  had  been impressively  predicted  in  1968  in  papers 
published separately by Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps.  They attacked the theoretical 
underpinnings of the Phillips curve and argued that what was important to both workers and 
employers was what happened to real wages not money wages.  They argued that the long-run 
Phillips  curve  was  in  fact  vertical  with  no  trade-off between  inflation  and  unemployment 
With regard to this trade-off, it is important to stress the non-linearity of the curve, with the cost, in terms 
of  increased inflation, of  further reductions in unemployment when the latter is already at a low level being 
much greater than a similar reduction at a higher level of  unemployment. -64-
ANNEX 1 
thereby  implying  that  the  long-run  effectiveness  of macroeconomic  policy  was  severely 
restricted. 
Friedman and Phelps introduced two key concepts into the traditional Phillips curve analysis: 
•  Inflation Expectations. 
•  Natural Rate of  Unemployment. 
INFLATION EXPECTATIONS:  Friedman and  Phelps  postulated  that the Phillips  curve 
relationship could not hold since the demand and supply of labour depends on changes in real 
wages and not money wages.  If one accepts this view, then there is no reason to believe that 
the level  of employment (and  consequently unemployment)  will  change when only  nominal, 
and not real, wages have changed. 
In the context of  wage bargaining negotiations, therefore, since workers are only interested in 
real wage developments they will try to anticipate future inflation in order to protect their real 
wage for the duration of  the contract. 
Consequently,  expected  price  inflation  is  crucial  to the  outcome  of any  negotiations  since 
changes in inflationary expectations will be reflected in changes in workers pay demands.  In 
such  a  situation,  equilibrium  can  only  be  restored  when  the  inflationary  expectations  of 
workers turn out to  be  correct.  In  equilibrium,  therefore,  nominal  variables  may  well  be 
changing  but  all  real  variables,  such  as  real  wages  and  employment  levels,  are  constant. 
Consequently, in a situation of  equilibrium the Phillips curve is vertical since real variables such 
as  employment are not changing and  as  a result unemployment is  the same regardless of the 
rate of  inflation. 
UNANTICIPATED INFLATION:  However, Friedman and Phelps did accept that a short-
run trade-off could exist when an economy was moving from one equilibrium to another such 
as  for  example  in  the  case  of an  unexpected  rise  in  inflation. 2  In these  circumstances  the 
inflationary expectations of workers are slow to adapt because of short-term "money illusion" 
and the cut in real wages implied by the higher inflation is not reflected in a reduced supply of 
labour.  As  a  result  of the  lower  real  wages  the  demand  for  labour  will  increase  and 
employment will be expanded, with workers being paid less in real terms.  However, the cut iti 
unemployment, as a result of  the unanticipated rise in inflation, will only persist for as long as 
workers suffer from  "money illusion".  Once the economy is back in  equilibrium,  real wages 
and  employment are  as  before but unfortunately the  rate  of inflation is  permanently  higher 
reflecting the change in workers price expectations. 
ACCELERATING INFLATION:  Consequently, the only way governments can maintain a 
short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment is through engineering additional, and 
unexpected, increases in inflation.  In this way the inflationary expectations of workers would 
continue to lag behind reality and the economy would be kept in a state of disequilibrium.  But, 
2  However  they  stressed that to  the extent that price behaviour  is  correctly  anticipated  there  can be  no 
significant unanticipated inflation and hence not even a short-run trade-off exists between inflation and 
unemployment. -65-
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of course,  such  a  situation  could  not  go  on  for  long  since  attempting  to  buy  lower 
unemployment at the price of  perpetually accelerating inflation is doomed to ultimate failure as 
workers  expectations will  adapt in  time  to  the new  policy  direction.  In  the  end  all  that 
governments would be left with would be an ever-accelerating inflation rate with no change in 
the underlying or equilibrium rate of  unemployment. 
NATURAL RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT:  The second major strand in the Phelps and 
Friedman analysis concerns the concept of the natural rate of unemployment.  At -the  natural 
rate of unemployment, all workers who are prepared to take jobs at the prevailing real wage 
are employed. Other broadly similar terms used to describe the natural rate of  unemployment 
are  the  NAIRU  (i.e.  "the  non-accelerating-inflation  rate  of unemployment"),  "equilibrium 
unemployment" and "structural unemployment". 
According to Friedman and Phelps inflation rate developments depend on the unemployment 
rate relative to the natural rate and not only  on the headline rate of unemployment.  When 
unemployment is at the natural rate, i.e.  in equilibrium, there is no pressure on wage rates or 
inflation.  However, when unemployment is  above  or below the natural rate,  downward or 
upward wage pressure occurs with inflation consequently falling or rising. 
It is important to note, however, that the natural rate of unemployment is  not an unalterable 
constant as evidenced by substantial upward shifts in this economic variable in the Community 
over the past two decades.  Movements in the opposite direction,  however,  will  only occur 
through an increased government emphasis on microeconomic policy actions aimed essentially 
at improving the overall flexibility of the labour market.  The instability in the Phillips curve 
relationship which emerged in the 1970s, reflected in substantial outward shifts of  the short-run 
Phillips curve, is consistent with the belief that the natural rate of  unemployment has increased 
markedly over time. 
REVISED  PHILLIPS  CURVE:  The  original  Phillips  curve  relationship  P*=f(u)  needs 
therefore to be amended to take on board the concepts of the natural rate of unemployment 
and  inflation  expectations.  Consequently,  the  inflation  rate  is  now  generally  accepted  to 
depend  both on inflationary  expectations  and  on the  deviation  of unemployment  from  the 
natural rate of unemployment i.e.  P* = P*e- a. (u- un) where P*e is inflationary expectations 
and a.  is  a coefficient which measures the responsiveness of inflation to changes in the gap 
between the actual and natural rates of unemployment.  In effect, the position of the Phillips 
curve  is  determined  by  price  expectations with an upward  shift  of the curve  reflecting  an 
increase in price expectations and with a downward shift of the curve reflecting the opposite. 
Consequently, there is  not just one stable Phillips  curve,  as  conditions up to the  1970s had 
suggested, but in fact there are an infinite number of curves,  one for each possible expected 
level of  inflation. 
Under  this  framework,  as  explained  earlier,  the  long-run  Phillips  curve  is  verticaP  (i.e. 
unemployment  and  inflation  are  independent  in  the  long-term)  with  the  price  of  any 
expansionary  policy  to  reduce  unemployment  being  an  ever-rising  or  accelerating  rate  of 
3  The inflation/unemployment trade-off is a short -term phenomenon since the Phillips curve tends to become 
vertical if  very low rates of unemployment are maintained for long. -66-
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inflation.  Consequently, there is no long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment.  A 
short-run trade-off can only exist if expectations are stable.  Once expectations adjust to the 
changing rates of  inflation and money illusion is removed, the economy reverts to its natural or 
equilibrium rate of  unemployment. 
If one accepts this thesis then one accepts, in effect, that in the long-run unemployment cannot 
be reduced by  accepting  a higher rate of inflation since the Phillips  curve is  vertical  at the 
natural rate of  unemployment. 
Finally,  it is important to stress that if the Phillips curve is vertical then attempts to hold the 
rate of unemployment below the natural rate will result in not only higher,  but accelerating, 
rates  of inflation.  In this  view  of the  world  the  only  way  that  governments  can  reduce 
unemployment is by  a long-term commitment,  at the microeconomic level,  to improving the 
workings of  the labour market and consequently reducing the "natural" rate. ANNEX 2: WAGE EQUATIONS: SPECIFICATION ISSUES -69-
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WAGE EQUATIONS: SPECIFICATION ISSUES 
With  regard  to  the  selection  of the  individual  explanatory  variables,  the  most  important 
considerations were to include an activity variable, represented by the unemployment rate, and 
an inflation variable and  to ensure that the overall equation replicated to the greatest extent 
possible the remaining key determinants of  nominal wage growth in the countries concerned. 
THE ACTIVITY VARIABLE- UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: It is generally accepted that it 
is appropriate to use the unemployment rate as a proxy for excess demand in the labour/output 
market. 
As  regards including  the  change  in  the  unemployment  rate  as  an  explanatory  variable,  the 
rationale would be to reflect the notion of hysteresis as  a determinant of wage adjustments. 
The  expected  sign  on  the  coefficient  would  be  negative  implying  that  a  decline  in  the 
unemployment rate would result in an overshoot of  wages and consequently could represent a 
potentially serious obstacle to a rapid reduction in the unemployment rate, with a slower pace 
of  decline necessary to avoid a derailing of  the policy course due to an acceleration in inflation. 
This  variable  when  introduced  in  the  basic  equation  was  often  found  to  be  statistically 
insignificant and incorrectly signed.  However significant and correctly signed coefficients were 
found in the case of  the Community as a whole and for Italy. 
INFLATION VARIABLE:  Nominal wages respond  to past and,  potentially,  to  expected 
inflation with the full  extent of any changes in consumer price inflation being rapidly reflected 
(i.e. within a year) in wage growth in all the countries concerned with the exception of  the US. 
Outside  the  US  changes  in  consumer  price  inflation  rapidly  affect  wage  developments  via 
price/wage links  and,  if accommodated,  can initiate  either an upward  or downward wage -
price spiral.  In the US, on the other hand, the slow response of nominal wages to changes in 
inflation means that wages have normally had a tendency to follow (i.e.  lag) rather than lead 
price inflation developments. 
With  regard  to  the  inflation  variable  two  issues  need  to  be  addressed,  namely  whether  to 
impose  price  homogeneity  (i.e.  indexation of wages  to  inflation)  or not  and  how  inflation 
expectations should be specified.  It was decided that since the form which indexation (formal 
or informal) takes varies widely among countries, due to the large variations in the institutional 
characteristics of  the wage determination process, that it would not be appropriate to impose a 
unitary coefficient on the inflation term.  However,  homogeneity is  regarded  as  an  a  priori 
guide to the expected size of the estimated coefficient since a value significantly lower than 1 
would indicate money illusion and above 1 would unrealistically suggest sustained changes in 
income distribution. 
The more difficult question in relation to the inflation variable concerns how best to specify 
inflation expectations.  This is a crucial question since the less quickly expectations are revised 
upwards, the greater the likelihood that they are going to lag behind reality.  This would mean 
that it would take a long time for indexation to occur and for equilibrium to be restored and 
that  perhaps  the  short-run  trade-off between  inflation  and  unemployment  may,  in  these 
circumstances,  be  of interest  to  policy  makers.  However,  if you  believe  the  rational 
expectations school, then all rational policy actions by governments are correctly anticipated by -70-
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economic agents so that price expectations no longer lag behind inflation and not even a short-
run trade-off exists. 
In this present analysis adaptive expectations are assumed for the following reasons: 
•  According to work done by Coe (see references) a specification using several different 
forms  of forward-looking  expectations  formation  did  not  improve  on  results  using 
current  and past inflation. 
•  A backward-looking specification appears to be more in keeping with the existence of 
indexation which means that changes in nominal wages essentially reflect an ex-post 
adjustment to inflation with the length of  the lag on past inflation reflecting the speed of 
indexation and the normal length of  contracts. 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY:  A  productivity  variable  (actual  and  lagged  versions)  was 
tested for all countries and in most cases was found to be significant.  Cyclical movements in 
productivity were found  to  be  particularly  significant  in  Germany  which  is  consistent  with 
wage bargaining behaviour in that country which takes explicit account of recent productivity 
developments.  It should be noted,  however,  that trend,  as  opposed to cyclical,  productivity 
growth is relatively stable and is incorporated in the "equilibrium"  component of the equation 
i.e. the constant term. 
TERMS OF TRADE:  It was felt important to include a variable in the equation to reflect the 
bargaining power of firms.  This variable can be seen as  a counterpart to the Phillips  curve 
effect in the equation which is in effect a proxy for the bargaining power of  trade unions e.g. if 
unemployment is high, the bargaining power of  trade unions is low and vice versa.  The idea of 
the terms of trade variable is therefore to show the distinction between the wage concept as 
seen from the viewpoint of employers from that as  seen by employees.  While employees, in 
terms of  labour supply, are interested in wage rates relative to consumer prices i.e.  real wage 
developments, employers in terms of  labour demand, are more interested in wage rates deflated 
by output prices.  One way of modelling this difference in perspective is to include a terms of 
trade  variable  which  is  constructed  as  the  difference  between  the  growth  of the  private 
consumption deflator and the growth of the GDP deflator.  The inclusion of this variable was 
found to be statistically significant in all cases. ANNEX 3: DETAILED WAGE EQUATION RESULTS FOR THE US, JAPAN, .EC 15, 
W.GERMANY, FRANCE, ITALY & THE UK -73-
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Annex 3: Detailed Wage Equation Results-2SLS Estimator 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
Dependent Variable is EURWAGE 
Sample: 1963  1994 
Instrument list: EURPCE(-1) C EURTOT  EURUNE:MP(-1) EURUNE:MPC 
Variable  Coefficient  Std E"or  T-Statistic  Prob. 
EURPCE  0.914279  0.082891  11.02985  0.0000 
EURTOT  -1.071154  0.235287  -4.552536  0.0001 
EURPROD  0.032594  0.154240  0.211324  0.8343 
EURUNEMP(-1)  -0.502447  0.075875  -6.622016  0.0000 
EURUNEMPC  -0.446924  0.282433  -1.582408  0.1261 
c  6.027421  1.218220  4.947729  0.0000 
AR(1)  0.270406  0.201479  1.342105  0.1916 
R-squared  0.970818  Mean dependent var  9.309375 
Adjusted R-squared  0.963814  S.D. dependent var  3.571785 
S.E. of  regression  0.679449  Akaike info criterion  -0.582307 
Sum squared resid  11.54127  Schwartz criterion  -0.261677 
F-statistic  127.9440  Durbin-Watson stat  1.997629 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
UNITED STATES 
Dependent Variable is USWAGE 
Sample:  1962 1994 
Instrument list: USW  AGE(  -1) USPROD US TOT(  -1) USUNE:MP(  -1) USUNE:MPC  C 
Variable  Coefficient  Std E"or  T-Statistic  Prob. 
USPCE(-1)  0.976236  0.108718  8.979558  0.0000 
USPROD  0.292190  0.135848  2.150860  0.0406 
USTOT(-1)  -0.749411  0.221358  -3.385525  0.0022 
USUNEMP(-1)  -0.726931  0.143309  -5.072475  0.0000 
USUNEMPC  -0.580921  0.239479  -2.425774  0.0222 
c  5.484158  0.678354  8.084510  0.0000 
R-squared  0.855115  Mean dependent var  6.009091 
Adjusted R-squared  0.828284  S.D. dependent var  2.040123 
S.E. of  regression  0.845398  Akaike info criterion  -0.172929 
Sum squared resid  19.29686  Schwartz criterion  0.099164 
F-statistic  28.53550  Durbin-Watson stat  2.180389 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 -74-
JAPAN 
Dependent Variable is JAWAGE 
Sample: 1963  1994 
Instrument list:  JAPROD JAPCE(-1)  JATOT  JAUNEMP(-1)  C 
Variable  Coefficient  Std E"or  T-Statistic  Prob. 
JAPCE  0.614692  0.297670  2.065012  0.0490 
JAPROD  0.196974  0.166733  1.181375  0.2481 
JATOT  -0.553390  0.213351  -2.593801  0.0154 
JAUNEMP(-1)  -4.276438  2.043748  -2.092449  0.0463 
c  13.15043  5.721575  2.298394  0.0298 
AR(1)  0.734719  0.163367  4.497341  0.0001 
R-squared  0.951486  Mean dependent var  9.015625 
Adjusted R-squared  0.942157  S.D. dependent var  6.240611 
S.E. of  regression  1.500905  Akaike info criterion  0.979498 
Sum squared resid  58.57064  Schwartz criterion  1.254323 
F-statistic  90.26345  Durbin-Watson stat  1.422422 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
W.GERMANY 
Dependent Variable is DEW  AGE 
Sample:  1963  1994 
Instrument list: DEPROD(-1) DEUNEMP(-1)  DETOT  DEPCE(-1)  C 
Variable  Coefficient  Std E"or  T-Statistic  Prob. 
DEPCE  0.885658  0.266218  3.326814  0.0026 
DEPROD(-1)  0.425296  0.199500  2.131808  0.0426 
DEUNEMP(-1)  -0.492681  0.170667  -2.886795  0.0077 
DETOT  -1.269267  0.256085  -4.956420  0.0000 
c  3.305669  1.772432  1.865047  0.0735 
AR(1)  0.002500  0.255585  0.009781  0.9923 
R-squared  0.882334  Mean dependent var  6.393750 
Adjusted R-squared  0.859705  S.D. dependent var  3.237576 
S.E. of  regression  1.212663  Akaike info criterion  0.552999 
Sum squared resid  38.23436  Schwartz criterion  0.827824 
F-statistic  33.35296  Durbin-Watson stat  2.218243 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
ANNEX3 Dependent Variable is FRWAGE 
Sample: 1962 1994 
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FRANCE 
Instrument list: FRPCE(  -1)  FRUNE:MP FRTOT C 
Variable  Coefficient 
FRPCE  1.025059 
FRUNEMP  -0.434415 
FRTOT  -0.535678 
FRPROD  0.131341 
c  4.960244 
AR(1)  0.242065 
R-squared  0.954948 
Adjusted R-squared  0.946604 
S.E. of  regression  1.036655 
Sum squared resid  29.01563 
F-statistic  106.7983 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
Dependent Variable is ITWAGE 
Sample:  1963  1994 
Std E"or  T-Statistic  Prob. 
0.088165  11.62656  0.0000 
0.098502  -4.410219  0.0001 
0.207656  -2.579644  0.0157 
0.205664  0.638617  0.5285 
1.526901  3.248571  0.0031 
0.180525  1.340891  0.1911 
Mean dependent var  9.342424 
S.D. dependent var  4.486231 
Akaike info criterion  0.234964 
Schwartz criterion  0.507056 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.103532 
ITALY 
Instrument list: ITPROD ITTOT ITUNE:MP(  -1) ITUNE:MPC(  -1) ITPCE(  -1) C 
Variable  Coefficient  Std E"or  T-Statistic  Prob. 
ITPCE  0.947455  0.070915  13.36044  0.0000 
ITPROD  0.457086  0.199864  2.286979  0.0306 
ITTOT  -1.531033  0.357277  -4.285286  0.0002 
ITUNEMP(-1)  -0.647785  0.244704  -2.647217  0.0136 
ITUNEMPC(-1)  -1.120617  0.675322  -1.659382  0.1091 
c  6.569068  2.477920  2.651041  0.0135 
R-squared  0.933292  Mean dependent var  12.90938 
Adjusted R-squared  0.920464  S.D. dependent var  5.935914 
S.E. of  regression  1.674056  Akaike info criterion  1.197860 
Sum squared resid  72.86408  Schwartz criterion  1.472685 
F-statistic  55.08293  Durbin-Watson stat  2.213379 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
ANNEX3 -76-
UNITED KINGDOM 
Dependent Variable is UKWAGE 
Sample:  1962 1994 
Instrument list: UKPCE(  -1)  UKTOT  UKPROD UKUNE~  UKUNE~C  C 
Variable  Coefficient  Std E"or  T-Statistic  Prob. 
UKPCE  0.792619  0.196962  4.024227  0.0004 
UKPROD  0.303506  0.206216  1.471784  0.1531 
UKTOT  -1.502427  0.236702  -6.347339  0.0000 
UKUNEMP  -0.176156  0.190812  -0.923191  0.3644 
UKUNEMPC  -0.181395  0.237055  -0.765199  0.4510 
c  4.088884  2.500652  1.635128  0.1141 
AR(l)  0.507776  0.195696  2.594720  0.0154 
R-squared  0.913124  Mean dependent var  10.13636 
Adjusted R-squared  0.893076  S.D. dependent var  5.541988 
S.E. ofregression  1.812186  Akaike info criterion  1.374899 
Sum squared resid  85.38444  Schwartz criterion  1.692340 
F-statistic  36.75618  Durbin-Watson stat  1.842169 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPTS OF EOUILffiRIUM AND 
DISEOUILffiRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT 
EQUILffiRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT:  It is now widely accepted that it is neither a feasible 
nor a desirable option to completely eliminate unemployment since  even when the economy 
and  the  labour  market  are  in  equilibrium  there  still  exists  some  "normal"  level  of 
unemployment.  This  "normal"  level  of unemployment  was  termed  the  "natural  rate  of 
unemployment" by Friedman in 1968 in order to conceptualise the notion that unemployment 
persists even at "full employment".  In other words natural or equilibrium unemployment refers 
to the long-run steady state to which the system returns to after a disturbance.  It has nothing 
therefore to do with the concept of market clearing.  Deviations from the natural rate could 
only be maintained at the cost of continuously accelerating or decelerating wage increases with 
the former leading to the well-known phenomenon of  wage-price spirals. 
A closely related concept, the non-accelerating inflation rate of  unemployment (NAIRU), was 
introduced by Tobin in an attempt also  to define the level of unemployment which persisted 
due  to frictions  and  imperfect information even when the  labour  market  is  in  equilibrium. 
Consequently, in the absence of  a perfectly competitive labour market which would, of course, 
lead to market clearing, the NAIRU or natural rate corresponds to the amount of  frictional and 
structural unemployment which continues to exist in an  economy even when the supply and 
demand  for  labour  are  in balance  i.e.  the  level  of unemployment  persisting  even when the 
labour market is in equilibrium. 
As the discussion in Section 4 of the main text highlights,  the NAIRU is  one of the two key 
concepts  introduced  to  show  that  policy  makers  cannot  buy  permanent  reductions  in 
unemployment by tolerating a higher rate of  inflation.  Once expectations have fully adapted to 
any  new  expansionary  policy  regime,  unemployment  will  ultimately  return to  that level  of 
unemployment required to hold inflation steady i.e. the NAIRU. 
The extent of "equilibrium",  ''voluntary" or "structural" unemployment varies, of course, both 
over time and from country to country depending on changes in the complex microeconomics 
of  national labour markets.  The main underlying explanatory factors for these shifts over time 
and for differences internationally are: 
•  differences in the flexibility and adaptability of  national labour markets; 
•  insider/outsider phenomena; 
•  obstacles to geographical/occupational mobility; 
•  rigidities due to the organisation and duration of  work; 
•  fiscal disincentives and the level of  social welfare benefits; 
•  inadequate education and training- inappropriate qualifications (mismatch problems); 
•  employment policies too oriented towards passive, as opposed to active, support. 
Given  the  extensive  array  of rigidities  and  inefficiencies  described  above  it  is  clear  that 
vigorous  policy  action will  be  needed  over many  years  to  substantially  reduce  equilibrium -08-
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unemployment.  Fundamental economic and social changes and a general reform of  the system 
of  incentives are urgently required if  the labour market is to work efficiently and be adapted to 
the needs of  the economy 
DISEQUILmRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT:  Whereas "equilibrium" unemployment is  linked 
to the microeconomics of  labour markets, disequilibrium unemployment results essentially from 
a malfunctioning of  the macro economy.  All industrialised economies have experienced severe, 
and often persistent, disequilibrium unemployment.  This type of  unemployment has its origins 
in a wide array of causes but for simplicity,  this  section will  confine itself to the distinction 
between the "classical" and "Keynesian" explanations of  disequilibrium unemployment. 
CLASSICAL UNEMPLOYMENT:  This type of unemployment occurs as  a result of the 
failure of  the labour market to establish the market-clearing real wage i.e. the real wage is too 
high,  leading to an excess supply of labour.  Unemployed people whose reservation wage is 
already at or below the market wage are  said to be involuntarily unemployed  since there is 
nothing they can do  to ensure that they will  receive  acceptable  employment.  Despite their 
willingness to accept jobs paying  less  than the market wage,  the labour markets'  failure  to 
establish the market-clearing real wage leaves them jobless. 
Why does the market real wage remain stuck at this inappropriately high level in a situation of 
an excess supply of labour?  In other words,  why  are real wages not downwardly flexible? 
Explanations for this market failure  lie  in the nature of labour markets and  in their inherent 
differences from goods markets.  Real wage inflexibility, with wages being set above market-
clearing levels, arise because of  a range of  influences such as: 
a)  Trade Unions. 
b)  Insider/Outsider Phenomena. 
c)  Imperfect Information (Efficiency wages). 
The operation of  trade unions tends to ensure that real wages are rigid by curbing the natural 
forces of supply and demand in the labour market.  Insider/outsider phenomena and imperfect 
information also acts to prevent real wages from being undercut.  Moreover, employers often 
prefer to enter into long-run contractual arrangements with employees offering real wage and 
employment  security  in  return for  loyalty  and  productivity  benefits.  While  such  mutually 
beneficial  arrangements  can often be justified  on efficiency  grounds  at  company level,  it  is 
generally accepted that enhanced real wage responsiveness to labour market conditions such as 
for example through naturally occurring real wage moderation (i.e.  moderating the level or at 
least the rate of increase of real wages)  can make  an important contribution to solving  the 
problem of  involuntary unemployment. 
KEYNESIAN UNEMPLOYMENT:  This type of unemployment has its origins in  cyclical 
downturns in economic activity.  Adverse demand shocks, such as a collapse in private sector 
investment or consumption spending,  or supply shocks,  caused by  cost increases (e.g.  the oil 
price increases of  the 1970s  ), can trigger a slump in economic activity and a consequent fall in 
the demand for labour and a rise in unemployment. The  close  link  between 
unemployment  and  fluctuations  of 
activity  around  a  long-term  trend 
was  measured  empirically  by  the 
US  economist,  Arthur  Okun.  He 
showed that in the US in the 1950s 
and  1960s that for every 3 percent 
fall  in the ratio of actual output to 
potential  output,  the  rate  of 
unemployment  increased  by  I 
percentage point.  This relationship 
became known as Okun's Law. 
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Actual and Potential  GOP Growth 
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This concept of potential output is  crucial to understanding the impact of a recession on the 
labour market.  Potential output is determined by the growth of the labour force,  4 the rate of 
capital accumulation and  technical progress and  provides an estimate of what output would 
have been if it had remained on a smooth growth path, free of  the normal cyclical fluctuations. 
When  an  adverse  demand  or  supply  shock  occurs,  the  actual  level  of output  falls  below 
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potential  output  and  an 
11 output  gap 
11  appears 
which  leads  to 
unemployment increases. 
It  is  crucially  important 
therefore  to  attempt  to 
maintain  the  economy 
near its trend growth path 
in order to avoid this type 
of 
11 output  gap 
11  or 
Keynesian  unemployment 
which reflects essentially a 
deficiency  of  aggregate 
demand.  This  type  of 
unemployment,  however, 
responds  favourably  to 
demand  increases through 
production and employment growth in conditions of stable prices and unchanged real wages. 
This favourable response to an increase in aggregate demand differs crucially, however, from 
the  situation with classical unemployment with firms  not responding  to  a boost in  demand 
unless there is a fall in real wages. 
4  It is interesting to note that there is a substantial body of evidence that the labour force responds negatively to unemployment 
with the result that discouraged workers, particularly the long-term unemployed, leave the labour force.  This is important when 
assessing potential output not only to look at the unemployment rate but also to take into account the loss of the productive 
potential of discouraged workers.  Therefore, measured unemployment does not represent anything like the total welfare costs 
since it fails to take account of "discouraged worker'' effects on future potential output developments. ANNEX 5: COMPARISON OF US AND COMMUNITY EMPLOYMENT 
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COMPARISON OF US AND COMMUNITY EMPLOYMENT PERFORMANCES 
1970-1993: OVERVIEW OF MAIN TRENDS AND DETAILED ANALYSIS OF 
LABOUR MARKET FLEXmiLITY 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of  this annex is the following: 
1.  To give an overview of  the main labour market developments in the US  and the 
Community over the period 1970-1993. 
2.  To look at the role of  labour market flexibility as an explanatory factor in terms of 
labour market trends in the US and the Community. 
3.  To present evidence as to why the US labour market is so much more flexible than 
those of  the Member States of  the Community. 
4.  To  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  US  can  retain  flexibility  while  effectively 
addressing the inequality issue? 
SECTION1  OVERVIEW OF MAIN LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND 
THEIR UNDERLYING CAUSES IN THE US AND THE COMMUNITY 
1970-1993 
Spectacular US Labour Market Performance:  There has been no trend increase in the US 
unemployment  rate  over the last two  decades  compared  with a  sharp  rise  of between 7-8 
percentage points in the equivalent rate for  the Community.  This  structural unemployment 
performance in the U.S. is remarkable when account is taken of  the fact that both employment 
and the labour force grew by nearly 50 per cent, in both cases, over the period in question.  By 
comparison the Community's  labour force  and  employment  grew by  only  18  and  5 percent 
respectively. 
The US  labour market has therefore shown a remarkable ability  to absorb  huge numbers of 
new entrants into its labour force without any sustained increase in its rate of unemployment. 
This  annex attempts to shed  some light on this  phenomenon by looking at labour force  and 
employment developments in the US  and by highlighting the main explanatory factors behind 
this performance. 
The main points to retain from this annex are as follows: 
1.  Main labour market trends 
Labour Force:  The annual average rate of  increase in the US active population 
over the period  1970-1993 was close to 2 percent compared with 0. 7 percent 
for the Community. 
Employment:  While  GDP  growth rates have been similar  in  the  US  and  the 
Community,  the  US  employment  performance  has  been  manifestly  superior. 
The numbers  employed  in  the  US  increased  by  37 Y2  million  since  1970,  an 
annual average increase of 1.6  percent,  compared with just 7 million  (0.3 per 
cent) in the Community. 
Unemployment:  The  US  unemployment  rate,  as  a  percentage  of the  civilian 
labour force,  increased only marginally,  from  6 percent in the early  1970s to -86-
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6. 7 per cent in  1993.  Community unemployment,  however,  grew from  2 1;2 
percent to close to 11  percent over the same period. 
2.  Explanations (or employment growth: The main influences on the US  and Community 
employment performances were: 
a)  GD.P growth. 
b)  Employment threshold developments: 
reductions in average working time; 
increase in the share of  part-time work; 
sectoral output shifts; 
capital/labour substitution. 
3.  Comparison  of US  and Community  employment performances:  Because  of the 
close association of the explanatory variables (i.e.  economic growth and productivity 
developments),  it is  impossible to draw firm  conclusions at a dis aggregated level in 
relation to the respective performances of the US  and  Community labour markets in 
terms  of job  creation.  However,  one  can  make  the  following  broad  statements  in 
relation to the possible sources of  the large differences in job-creating performances. 
L  GDPgrowth 
The superior US  employment performance does not emanate from faster growth since 
GDP growth outturns in the two regions have been virtually identical over the period 
analysed. 
II  Employment threshold developments. 
While  the  output  performances  may  have  been  similar,  the  US  has  produced  this 
additional output by using a greater amount of  the factor input labour than was the case 
in the Community.  What are the factors underlying this trend?  A  number of possible 
explanations exist: 
A.  Reductions in average working time:  The decline in the weekly hours of  work 
for total private sector employees in the US  over the period 1970-1993 was of 
the order of 7 %.  If one makes the heroic assumption that this  reduction in 
hours worked was neutral in terms of productivity then such a decline  should 
lead to a proportional increase in the level of employment.  Therefore,  5-5  Y2 
million  of the  37 Y2  million  jobs  created  could,  under  this  highly  restrictive 
assumption, have come from this factor.  Comparable data are not available for 
the EC.  However,  an analysis of broadly similar data for the period  1983-90 
shows that the total decline in the hours worked in the EC was roughly double 
that which occurred in the US  over the same period.  The latter data would 
therefore  appear  to  point  to  a  greater  role  for  changes  in  working  time  in 
explaining employment trends in the Community rather than in the US. 
B.  Increase  in the share of  part-time work:  In the  US,  a  little  over  8 million 
additional part-time jobs were created over the period 1970-93  compared with 
over 29 million new full-time posts.  If  one looks at data for the EC4 {WD, F, I, 
UK) for the period 1973-1992, one finds that the number of  part-time jobs grew 
by 6 Y4 million over the period, with the number of full-time positions growing -87-
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by 9 Y4 million.  Therefore, as with working time, the share of part-time work in 
overall employment creation in the Community over the period in question was 
much greater than that in the US. 
C  Sectoral output shifts:  Could the expansion of service sector activities explain 
the difference in job performances between the US and the Community?  Again 
as  with points A.  and  B.  above,  it would not appear to provide an adequate 
explanation.  Over the period 1970-90 the share of service sector employment 
in  overall  employment  grew  by  10  percentage  points  in  the  US  while  the 
relative share of the services sector in overall  employment in the Community 
(although starting from a much lower base)  grew in  fact  by  an  even  greater 
amount i.e.  16  Y2 percentage points. 
D.  CapitaVlabour substitution:  Unlike points A.  B.  and C.  above the slower rise 
in US capital intensity compared with the Community over the period 1970-93 
was,  in fact,  a major factor explaining the relatively stronger US job creation 
performance  over the  period  in  question.  But why  did  US  producers  use 
relatively more of  the factor input labour in generating a broadly similar output 
performance to that of the Community?  It is  contended in this annex that any 
factor which has the effect of  reducing the relative attractiveness of  labour, be it 
a slowdown in the overall rate of  increase in the supply of  labour, a shortage of 
particular types  of labour,  a lack  of investment  in  training  and  education,  a 
relatively  immobile  labour force  or a wage formation  process  which fails  to 
generate flexible  and  differentiated  wage settlements,  the  greater will  be the 
incentive for firms to increase the capital intensity of  their production processes. 
Some of the above factors  may  have been responsible  in the Community for 
capital being increasingly substituted for labour with the opposite trend in  the 
US  of less capital intensity reflecting the greater overall flexibility/efficiency of 
the US labour market. 
4.  Labour  market  flexibility:  Wage  flexibility  and labour  mobility:  Flexibility  with 
regard to both aggregate and  relative wages has  been a major factor  explaining the 
limited  deterioration in the US  labour market performance over the period.  A high 
degree  of regional  and  occupational  mobility  has  complemented  this  flexible  wage 
formation process and has helped to facilitate  the real wage adjustment necessary to 
absorb regional or sectoral shocks.  Less generous social welfare provisions,  a lower 
overall  tax burden,  wider income  differentials,  low  unionisation  rates,  decentralised 
wage bargaining and  easier hiring/firing rules have all  contributed to this inherent US 
flexibility. 
5.  US policy challenge: Retain flexibility and address the inequality problem:  For the 
Clinton administration, the key labour market preoccupation at the present time is the 
growing skills-based disparities in earnings and employment as a result of  the mismatch 
between the jobs that are being  created  and  the job-seekers; i.e.  excess  demand for 
skilled labour and excess supply of unskilled labour.  This appears largely responsible 
for the increased wage inequality (and the related problem of the working poor, with 
the real wages of  the unskilled falling sharply in the 1980s in both absolute and relative 
terms) and the high level of  male unemployment in the age group 25 to 45. -88-
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The Clinton administration appears to feel  that the  answer to this  problem will  not 
come from  the  introduction of labour market  regulations  to  excessively  limit  these 
market generated wage differentials.  The present US approach centers around the need 
to retain the flexibility inherent in the present system whilst addressing the mismatch 
problem  through  increased  expenditure  on  active  labour  market  policies  and 
educational/training programmes. 
SECTION2  LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY 
OVERVIEW 
Key role for flexibility:  Labour market flexibility refers to both wage flexibility and labour 
mobility.  Adjusting to  economic shocks is  made easier if absolute and  relative real  labour 
costs adjust relatively flexibly.  Such price flexibility is necessary to restore competitiveness, at 
the  national  or regional  level,  and  to  bring  output  and  employment  back  to  equilibrium. 
Regional and occupational mobility also  contributes to overall labour market flexibility  by 
substituting for,  or complementing, the real wage adjustment necessary to absorb regional or 
sectoral shocks. 
Role played in  the  US:  With  regard  to  the  U.S.,  labour  market flexibility  is  generally 
accepted to be high.  Real wage flexibility,  combined with a high degree of labour mobility 
have combined to limit the deterioration in the performance of the U.S.  labour market over 
recent decades.  There has been no trend increase in U.S.  unemployment since 1970 despite 
both experiencing substantial economic shocks during the period and witnessing increases in 
both its  labour force  and  employment  of close  to  50 percent over the period  as  a  whole. 
Various  proxy  measures  of U.S.  structural  unemployment  (NAIRU,  Beveridge  and  Okun 
curves)  suggest  that  the  latter  has  remained  at  between  6-7  percent  over  the  period,  a 
performance which is in stark contrast with the experience of the Community over the same 
period.  In addition, long-term unemployment is of the order of 5-l  0 per cent of the overall 
total in  the U.S.  compared with around  50  percent  in  the  EU.  Finally,  a  high  degree  of 
geographic mobility in the U.S. has increased overall labour market flexibility by ensuring that 
the effects of  sectoral and regional shocks were absorbed to a far greater extent than in regions 
such as Western Europe where for cultural and linguistic reasons labour mobility is relatively 
restricted. 
AGGREGATE AND RELATIVE WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN THE US: SOME EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE 
Real  wage  flexibility  has  been  cited  above  as  a  major  factor  explaining  the  strong  US 
employment performance.  It has been purported that flexibility with regard to both aggregate 
and  relative  wages  substantially  explains  the limited  deterioration in  the  US  labour  market 
performance over the last two decades.  Because of the key  role which  such flexibility  has 
played, it is important therefore to look at this area in more detail* . 
Most  of the  tables  and  graphs  in this  section  are  taken  directly  from  the  background  documentation 
prepared for the OECD's .. Jobs Study  ... -89-
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The analysis which follows looks at two broad areas: 
A.  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  LABOUR DEMAND AND LABOUR COSTS. 
1.  Aggregate level. 
2.  Relative wages and demand for different groups of  workers. 
B.  RESPONSIVENESS OF WAGES TO UNEMPLOYMENT. 
1.  Aggregate wage flexibility. 
2.  Flexibility of  relative wages by education, age and gender. 
3.  Flexibility of  relative wages by regions. 
A.  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  LABOUR DEMAND AND LABOUR COSTS. 
Substantial evidence exists of a negative relationship between the demand for labour and the 
cost of  labour in the longer run. 
A.l: Labour demand and labour costs at the aggregate level:  Table 1 below gives estimates 
for the relationship between real wage developments and labour demand in the private sector. 
The  table  shows  that  while  the  long  run  responsiveness  of private  sector  employment  to 
changes in labour costs may be  similar among industrialised countries substantial differences 
exist as regards the speed with which labour demand responds. 
TABLE 1 
REAL WAGES AND LABOUR DEMAND IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
Long-term Employment  Mean Lag (Years) 
Elasticity 
United States  -1.0  1.0 
Euroeean Communit~ 
-Germany  -1.0  2.0 
-France  -1.0  2.0 
-Italy  -0.5  5.0 
-UK  -1.0  4.0 
Source: T. Tyrvainen: Paper Prepared for Jobs Study 1993 
For instance  a  one  percent reduction in  labour  costs would,  according to the  estimates  in 
Table 1,  typically  increase labour demand in the private sector by  1 percent in the long run. 
While the long-run response, because of technology convergence, is  similar across countries, 
the short-term adjustment speeds differ substantially.  For example, labour demand in the US 
adjusts to changes in labour costs by far the fastest of  the countries mentioned with half of  the 
adjustment completed in  one year.  For the countries of the European Community,  a similar 
degree of  adjustment would appear to require between two and five years. 
Given  the  substantial  real  wage  adjustment  which  has  occurred  in  many  countries  in  the 
Community in the 1980s part of  the gap between actual and equilibrium unemployment in the -90-
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Community may therefore be due to employment adjustment occurring with a lag.  Flexibility 
enhancing  policies  (including  active labour market policies)  are  therefore  needed  in  a large 
number of Member States to speed up the adjustment of unemployment towards equilibrium 
following a shock and to reduce equilibrium unemployment. 
A.2  Relative wages and demand for different groups of  workers:  Overall labour demand 
depends not only on the average wage level but also on the distribution of wages because of 
the  need  to  accommodate  different  ability  levels.  It  is  not  normally  possible  to  observe 
individuals' abilities or productivity levels.  However, since profit maximising employers should 
not  pay  wages  in  excess  of productivity  levels  then  you  would  expect  that  the  wage 
distribution in a country could be envisaged to closely shadow the distribution of abilities or 
personal productivity levels. 
However,  because  of  social  r;:;G;:RA;;P:;H:;:1 ==================::;-, 
justice  concerns  about  an 
unequal income distribution in an 
economy, institutional constraints 
are  often introduced  at the  low 
end  of  the  ability  range  to 
prevent  wages  from  being 
aligned  with  productivity  levels, 
e.g.  minimum  wage  rates. 
Unfortunately,  however, 
measures  such  as  minimum 
wages  normally  have  a  negative 
impact  on  the  demand  for  low-
skilled  workers.  As  Graph 1 
WAGE DISPERSION AND PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 
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shows there is  a strong positive correlation between a widening of earnings differentials  and 
private  sector  employment  growth.  Greater  earnings  differentials  tend  to  create  job 
opportunities for low-skilled workers such as the young and the lower-educated.  In fact, in the 
1980s in those countries where the relative wages of low-skilled workers have fallen the most 
(e.g. the US) private sector employment growth has been the most impressive .. Relative wage 
inflexibility,  on the other hand,  reflected in a compressed wage distribution,  is  likely to have 
strongly contributed to the concentration of  unemployment among certain age and skill groups 
in the Community. 
B.  WAGE ADJUSTMENTS AND UNEMPLOYMENT: 
For equilibrium to be restored to the labour market following a shock two conditions appear to 
be necessary: 
a)  A negative relationship must exist between-labour demand and labour costs. 
b)  Wages must respond to changes in market conditions. 
For example,  if the  above  conditions  are  met,  an  increase  in  unemployment,  following  an 
adverse  shock,  would  lead  to  a  moderation  in  real  wage  demands  which  in  turn  would -91-
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stimulate  the  demand  for  labour up  to  the  point where unemployment  settles  down  at  its 
natural level thereby restoring labour market equilibrium.* 
Sections B.l, B.2 and  B.3  below attempt to assess the extent and  speed with which labour 
market  slack  puts downward  pressure on real wages  and  vice  versa.  Section B 1 looks  at 
aggregate wage flexibility with sections B2 and B3  looking at the flexibility of relative wages 
by education, age, gender and region. 
B.l  Aggregate  wage  flexibility:  (Defined  as  "Uniform  changes  in  the  wages  of all 
employees  in  response  to  an  increase  in  aggregate  unemployment").  Real  wages 
respond to the state of  the labour market in the long run, with the rate of  growth of  real 
wages linked  to  the level  of the unemployment  rate.  However,  while  the long-run 
responsiveness of wages to unemployment is  not in doubt, the problem relates to the 
very gradual nature of the adjustment process.  The longer the adjustment period the 
slower the speed at which unemployment can be returned to equilibrium following an 
adverse shock.**  Table 2 below shows that while the adjustment process is relatively 
quick in the US and the UK, it is particularly slow in the case of  Germany and Italy. 
* 
TABLE 2. 
REAL WAGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT (ESTIMATION RESULTS) 
Long-term Real Wage  Mean Lag 
Response  (years) 
United States  -1.0  1.0 
Germany  -3.0  4.0 
France  -3.5  1.5 
Italy  -2.5  2.0 
UK  -1.0  1.0 
Sources  T. Tyrvainen: Report prepared for Jobs Study 1993. 
OECD Jobs Study: "This equilibrium or natural level (of unemployment) is unlikely to be market clearing, because it 
is also determined by industrial relations arrangements, product-market  competition,  social welfare provisions and 
possibly taxes.  Changes in any of these variables will shift the equilibrium unemployment rate.  However, if wages 
are not responsive  to  the level  of unemployment  or the wage  impact  is  only  transitory,  there  will be no  unique 
equilibrium rate and unemployment can settle down at whatever rate it is driven to by history ("hysteresis")". 
**  lMF:  "Policies that increase the flexibility  of labour m&kets will reduce the  strength of forces  that tend to  make 
cyclical  unemployment persist,  thereby  speeding the reduction in cyclical  unemployment.  By  reducing  structural 
unemployment at the same time that cyclical unemployment is falling, labour market reforms can reduce the risk of a 
build-up of  inflationary pressures that would cut short or restrain the next expansion". -92-
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B. 2  Flexibility of  relative wages by education, age and gender: 
When the structure of the relative demand for,  and the relative supply of,  different groups of 
workers is changing, relative wage flexibility is crucial for employment creation. 
GRAPH 2 
US RATIO OF AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS OF COLLEGE 
GRADUATES TO HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES 
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Source: US Current Population Survey 
Education and Skills:  Graph 2 shows that the relative wages of college graduates in the US 
compared to high school graduates have increased substantially throughout the 1980s.  This is 
in stark contrast with Community countries such as France where education differentials have 
become  more  compressed  and  with  Germany  and  Italy  where  the  wage  structure  by 
education/skills has been stable since the late 1970s.  Table 3 also confirms the above thesis. 
TABLE 3 
EARNINGS OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATED MEN RELATIVE TO MEN WITH LOWER 
SECONDARY EDUCATION OR LESS (LATE 1970S=100) 
Germany  Italy  UK  USA 
Late 1970s  100  100  100  100 
Late 1980s  97  103  111  120 
Late 1990s  - 101  121  127 
Age: Table 4 shows that while there has been a decline in the relative wages of  young people in 




EARNINGS OF MEN AGED 15-24 RELATIVE TO MEN AGED 25-54 
1980  1990 
Italy  100  101 
UK  100  99 
us  100  89 
Gender:  The fact that the tightening of the female labour market in the US  relative to that of 
men  led  to  an  increase  in  the  relative  wages  of women  suggests  that  the  gender  wage 
differential in the US also seems to have responded to relative unemployment rates. 
B.3  Flexibility of relative wages  by  regions:  No  significant  regional  differentiation  of 
wages should exist in a national market characterised by a high degree of geographical labour 
mobility.  However, with the decline in regional migration in recent decades,  regional wage 
flexibility has become ever more important. Regional wages must adjust flexibly to persistent 
differences in regional unemployment rates.  This appears to be the case with the regional wage 
structure in the US  (Table 5),  with higher relative regional unemployment inducing  relative 
wage cuts in the region concerned.  This is in contrast with the position in Germany and Italy 
for example where no changes in wage relativities occurred in the high unemployment regions 
in the 1980s despite having an average unemployment rate of  more than twice that in the low-
unemployment areas. 
TABLES 
HIGH AND LOW UNEMPLOYMENT REGIONS: WAGES AND JOBLESSNESS OVER TIME 
1975  1980  1987 
United States 
Unemployment Ratio*  0.95  1.23  2.15 
Wage Ratio  0.95  1.00  -0.88 
Germany 
Unemployment Ratio  1.39  1.98  2.27 
Wage Ratio  1.04  1.00  0.98 
France 
Unemployment Ratio  1.08  1.43  1.47 
Wage Ratio  0.96  1.00  0.98 
Italy 
Unemployment Ratio  2.70  2.60  2.97 
Wage Ratio  0.96  1.00  1.02 
Source: OECD 
* Ratio of  the rate of  unemployment in the high unemployment regions to the rate of  unemployment in the low unemployment regions. -94-
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SECTION3  WHY IS THE US LABOUR MARKET SO MUCH MORE FLEXIBLE 
THAN THOSE OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMUNITY? 
The answer to the above question boils down to a number of factors including strong growth 
in the labour supply in the US, a high degree of  geographical and occupational mobility and to 
the fact that US government intervention in the workings of its labour market has, in general, 
been much more limited that in most of  the EC's Member States.  Since the labour supply and 
mobility factors have been looked at in earlier sections of  this analysis it is appropriate that the 
following  tables  and  graphs  concentrate  on  illustrating  the  major  differences  in  terms  of 
government intervention. 
i.  Less  generous  social  welfare  provzszons:  less  coverage  and  stricter  eligibility 
requirements for benefits,  lower  replacement  ratios,  shorter  duration  of benefit 
payout (Table 6). 
TABLES 
BENEFIT DURATION AND REPLACEMENT RATIO 
Incidence of long-term  Maximum duration of  Replacement Ratio (3) 
unemployment (1)  unemployment benefits 
(weeks)(2) 
United States  7.7  26  50 
Germany  42.2  52  58 
Netherlands  47.8  156  70 
Belgium  70.6  *  60 
Denmark  32.5  130  64 
France  40.5  130  59 
Italy  63.0  26  15 
UK  41.6  52  26 
Ireland  57.7  65  43 
Spain  50.6  104  80 
(  1)  Long-term unemployment as a percentage of total unemployment (  1979-1989 average).  Generous benefit 
levels and duration tend to be associated with a higher proportion of long-term unemployed in the  overall 
unemployment total. 
(2)  1989 
(3)  Ratio of maximum benefits to previous earnings (married person)  .  Unemployment insurance is provided indefinitely  . 
Source: OECD -95-
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ii.  Low overall taxation burden:  Graph 3 and Table 7 show the overall marginal tax 
wedge in the US  and the Community and give figures for total tax revenue as  a 
percentage ofGDP. 
TABLE 7 
TOTAL TAX REVENUE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GOP 
1978  1985  1991 
us  28.9  28.7  29.8 
Belgium  45.0  47.9  44.9 
France  38.6  44.5  44.2 
Germany  37.9  38.1  39.2 
Italy  27.4  34.5  39.7 
Netherlands  43.6  43.8  47.0 
Spain  22.8  28.8  34.7 
U.K  33.0  37.8  36.0 
Source: OECD 
GRAPH3 
OVERALL MARGINAL TAX WEDGE* IN THE US AND IN THE COMMUNITY 
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earnings of an average production worker. Consumption tax rates are calculated 
from aggregate tax and national income data. Source:OECD 
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iii.  Wider earnings dispersions: (Graph 4)  Note: While a minimum wage rate does exist 
in the US the latter is at such a low rate (i.e. less than 40 percent of  the average wage) 
that it is generally accepted as not significantly affecting wage trends and therefore has 
little negative influence on employment,  except perhaps for some groups of unskilled 
young workers. 
GRAPH 4  INCIDENCE OF LOW PAY 
(% of full-time workers earning less than 50% of median earnings) 
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Source: OECD 
iv.  Low and declining rate of  union membership. 
TABLE 8 
UNION DENSITY IN US AND COMMUNITY (1975-1988) 
1975  1985  1988 
us  22.8  18.0  16.4 
Belgium  55.3  54.3  53.0 
Denmark  67.4  78.3  73.2 
France  22.8  16.3  12.0" 
Germany  36.6  37.4  33.8 
Ireland  55.2  56.0  52.4 
Italy  47.2  42.0  39.6 
Netherlands  38.4  28.7  25.0 
UK  48.3  45.5  41.5 
Source: OECD -97-
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v.  Less centralised wage  bargaining and less  government involvement in  the wage 
bargaining process. 
Table 9 
The level of bargaining in the 1970s and 1980s 
Predominant bargaining level in the 1980s 
CENTRAL  SECTORAL  ENTERPRISE/ 
PLANT 
CENTRAL  Finland  Austria 
Norway 
Sweden 
Australia  Belgium  United Kingdom 
Predominant  France 
bargaining  Germany 
level  SECTORAL  Netherlands 
in the 1970s  Portugal 
Spain 
ENTERPRISE  United States 
PLANT  Canada 
Japan 
Source:  F.  Traxler, "The level and coverage of collective bargaining: A  cross-national study of patterns and 
trends," OECD, 1993 
Table 10 
Bargaining levels, bargaining co-ordination and labour-market performance (1) 
Unemployment  Total  Private  Public 
rate  employment  employment  employment 
1973  1989  1973=100 
Bargaining  levels 
(2) 
Centralised  1.9  2.9  112  101  151 
Sectoral  2.9  9.4  109  105  137 
Company/plant  3.4  4.6  129  130  127 
Bargaining  co-
ordination(3) 
High  1.2  3.9  115  114  128 
Low  1.6  1.0  113  105  150 
Limited  2.8  10.4  106  100  143 
Lacking  4.3  5.5  133  135  128 
Notes: 1. Classification based on bargaining arrangements in the 1970s. 
2.  Centralised: Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Sectoral: Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, Company. United States, Canada, Japan, 
United Kingdom. 
3. High: Japan Australia, Austria, Germany: Low; Sweden, Switzerland; Limited: Belgium, Finland, France, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain: Lacking: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, New Zealand 
Source: OECD -98-
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vi.  Less restrictive legislation on the hiring/firing of  employees e.g.  less oppressive job 
security legislation, measured in terms of  months of  severance pay or notice period 
required 
TABLE 11 
JOB SECURITY LEGISLATION 
Job security legislation(1) 
United States  0.0 
Germany  3.0 
Netherlands  5.9 
Belgium  2.0 
Denmark  0.0 
France  3.5 
Italy  13.7 
UK  8.4 
Ireland  14.0 
Spain  13.7 
(1 ). Months of severance pay or notice period required. 
Source: OECD 
CONCLUSION:  The  above  list  of features,  combined  with  the  greater  geographical 
mobility and strong growth of the US  workforce,  have been  the cornerstone of the  US 
economy's ability to adjust comparatively quickly to adverse disturbances. 
SECTION4:  CAN THE  US  RETAIN FLEXIBILITY WHILE  EFFECTIVELY 
ADDRESSING THE INEQUALITY  ISSUE ? 
Inequality issue:  While  the overall  impact  of the  comparatively  strong US  labour market 
flexibility  is  overwhelmingly  positive,  particularly  in  relation  to  employment  creation,  the 
concern generated by the social implications of the above flexibility,  most notably increased 
income inequality and the phenomenon of  the "working poor" needs to be assessed in any 
.  overall evaluation of  this "reduced-interference" approach to the labour market. 
Reduced demand for low-skilled workers: The greater flexibility of  the US labour market has 
indeed led to declining real wages for low skilled workers and an overall widening of  the wage 
distribution.  However, to blame this development on inappropriate US labour market policies 
would be to ignore a large part of  the story.  While inadequate training and education has been 
partially responsible for the phenomenon of the "working poor",  a major factor has been the 
world-wide trend towards reduced demand  for low-skilled workers as a result of  accelerated 
structural changes,  due to  the speed of technical innovation,  and increased competition 
from low-cost producers. 
Distributional v efficiency objectives: It should be stressed that attempting to halt this process 
of structural change is futile and that correcting for inequality which is a direct result of these 
global  changes  through  regulations  that  distort  the  functioning  of  labour  markets  is -99-
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inappropriate.  Such  distributional  objectives  can  in fact  be  more  efficiently  achieved 
through  changes  in  the  taxation  and social  welfare  systems@  and through  improved 
education and training programmes. 
Why is regulation inappropriate as a cure for inequality? 
1.  Using labour market regulation such as minimum wage legislation or wage bargaining 
systems that excessively limit wage differentials between individuals, sectors or regions, 
despite productivity differentials,  may not in fact reduce income inequalities  since 
such policies often protect those already employed to the detriment of 
11 outsiders 
11  who 
tend to be drawn from the most vulnerable and least-skilled cohorts of  society. 
2.  Furthermore,  to the  extent that wage differentials  reflect differences  in  the  marginal 
products of various types of workers, wider differentials provide a greater incentive 
for a more efficient allocation of  the workforce across sectors and hence result in 
greater labour demand. 
Overall, therefore, not only can such polices fail to achieve equity objectives, they can generate 
enormous economic and social costs by contributing to high rates of  structural unemployment. 
What is  the best solution?  Since  earnings  differentials  must to a  significant  extent reflect 
productivity and  skill  differentials,  the only workable  solution to the problem of low-skilled 
workers is  to permit such differentials  to  exist while  at the  same  time  implementing  active 
labour market policies to increase the productivity of such workers (i.e.  work experience, 
better education and training) and targeted programmes to ease the short-term hardship. 
This appears to be the broad approach being adopted by the Clinton administration.  The 
latter wishes to retain the flexibility inherent in the present US  system while at the same time 
taking practical measures aimed at addressing the inequality issue.  This has led  to a vibrant 
public debate in the US  on the following key labour market policy areas which will form the 
main plank of  US attempts to remedy the inequality problem. 
1.  Key role for active labour market polices and changes to unemployment benefit 
systems. 
11.  Human capital policies: Training and education. 
1.  Active labour market policies and changes to unemployment benefit systems. 
The US  devotes  a relatively  small  proportion of its  GDP  to  public  expenditure  on 
labour  market  policies  (unemployment  benefit,  early  retirement  and  active  labour 
market  policies).  Within  this  low  overall  spending  total  (Tables  12  and  13),  they 
allocate  a  relatively  small  proportion  to  active  policies.  It  should  be  underlined, 
@  Appropriately designed and well-targeted taxation (e.g. negative income taxes) and social transfer programmes (e.g. 
supplemental income support) are more effective in offsetting the socially unacceptable distributional consequences of 
bold steps to implement broadly based labour market reforms aimed at fostering job creation and the incentives to seek 
employment.  Increasing the flexibility and efficient functioning of labour markets demands imaginative initiatives to 
ensure that the smooth operation of market forces  does not result in an unacceptable degree of social unrest within 
countries. - 100-
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however,  that the extent of the problem to be  addressed in the US  (see Graph 5 on 
long-term unemployment)  is  on a completely  different  scale  to  that  confronting  the 
Community. 
TABLE 12 
ACTIVE AND PASSIVE LABOUR MARKET MEASURES (1990) 
us  Germany  France  UK  Italy 
Total  spending  on  0.7  1.9  2.0  2.2  1.1 
labour  market 
measures  (active 
and  passive,  per 
cent of GDP) 
Active  policies  as  29.0  41.0  35.0  38.0  65.0 
per  cent  of  total 
spending 




PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON LABOUR MARKET PROGRAMMES: 
USVGERMANY 
us  Germany 
Programme Categories  Public expenditures as per cent of GOP (1992) 
1. Public Employment Services  0.08  0.24 
2.  Labour Training  0.08  0.59 
3. Youth Measures  0.04  0.06 
4. Subsidised Employment  0.01  0.52 
5.  Measures for the Disabled  0.05  0.24 
6.  Unemployment Compensation  0.58  1.32 
7.  Early Retirement Schemes  - 0.49 
Total  0.84  3.46 
(Active Measures 1-5)  (0.25)  (1.64) 
(Passive Measures 6-7)  (0.58)  (1.81) 
Source: OECD - 101- ANNEX5 
GRAPH 5  LONG~ERM UNEMPLOYMENT 
(Continuously unemployed for one year or more -% of  total unemployment) 
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Source: Eurostat and OECD 
11.  Human capital policies: training and education 
Training and education are essential policies for boosting the quality of human capital 
in economies.  Such policies are needed to create "high-skill"  workforces which will 
secure a continuous increase in productivity and living standards. 
As  mentioned  earlier  rapid  structural  changes  in  world-wide  labour  markets  have 
widened the income disparity between skilled and unskilled workers.  In the US, this is 
seen as a key area where action is needed to promote employment and competitiveness. 
(i)  Though per capita education spending is similar to that in other OECD countries, 
average educational attainment has been less  satisfactory,  and  drop-out rates for 
minorities (Black and Hispanic) have been high (up to 33 per cent). 
(ii)  Unemployment for those with low educational achievements is high,  both relative 
to total unemployment, and in particular relative to other countries. 
(iii) Wage dispersion across educational standards, as mentioned earlier, is substantially 
greater in the US than in most other countries. - 102-
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(iv)  The level of spending on training,  public  and private, is  low by  OECD standards 
and private sector training focuses  mainly  on  managers,  rather than on the less 
skilled. 
TABLE 14 
PROPORTION OF WORKERS WHO NEEDED QUALIFICATIONS TO OBTAIN THEIR 
CURRENT JOB 
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES {1990/91) 
TYPE OF QUALIFICATION REQUIRED 
Needed any  Formal company  Informal 
qualifications  training  on-the-job 
training 
Germany 
All employees  94.2  51.9  23.5 
0-1  year tenure  91.0  45.8  27.6 
6-9 years tenure  91.1  54.4  25.3 
15+ years tenure  96.5  53.5  18.8 
United States 
All employees  55.8  12.1  27.1 
0-1  year tenure  49.0  9.1  25.1 
6-9 years tenure  61.7  15.0  30.2 
15+ years tenure  60.7  15.7  27.5 
Note: Formal company training refers to needing an occupational certificate, and informal training 
refers to requiring short on-the-job training or longer training in the firm. 
Source: OECD - 103-
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